Israeli Defense Minister Meeting, March 17, 1992

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lead_403_005_all_tr.txt

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Extent (Dublin Core)

3 Pages

File Name (Dublin Core)

lead_403_005_all

Title (Dublin Core)

Israeli Defense Minister Meeting, March 17, 1992

Date (Dublin Core)

1992-03-17

Date Created (Dublin Core)

1992-03-17

Congress (Dublin Core)

102nd (1991-1993)

Policy Area (Curation)

International Affairs

Creator (Dublin Core)

Dole, Robert J., 1923-2021

Record Type (Dublin Core)

notes (documents)

Rights (Dublin Core)

http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/CNE/1.0/

Language (Dublin Core)

eng

Collection Finding Aid (Dublin Core)

https://dolearchivecollections.ku.edu/index.php?p=collections/findingaid&id=26&q=

Physical Location (Dublin Core)

Collection 007, Box 403, Folder 5

Institution (Dublin Core)

Robert J. Dole Institute of Politics, University of Kansas, Lawrence, KS

Archival Collection (Dublin Core)

Robert J. Dole Republican Leadership Collection, 1985-1996

Full Text (Extract Text)

(page 1)
BOB DOLE
KANSAS

(the following line is handwritten with pencil)
March 17, 1992

United States Senate
OFFICE OF THE REPUBLICAN LEADER
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-7020

(the remainder of this page is handwritten with black ink pen)
Senators for Arens Meeting
-
- Cohen
- Dole
- Chafee
- Cochran
- Rudman
- Simpson
- Arens
- Shoval - Ambassador to U.S.
-
(the following line is scribbled-out)
Cochran Chafee Rudman
(end of page 1)



(page 2)
SENATOR: Re: your meeting with Israeli Defense Minister Arens, Tuesday, March 17, 2:30 pm.

\[underlined]ISSUES. Israeli sale of U.S. technology. [end underlined] This issue broke after Arens scheduled his trip here, but it will undoubtedly now be the focus of his discussions. The Israelis have denied they sold Patriot missiles to China, and have invited the U.S. to inspect their Patriot arsenal. But they have virtually admitted at least some of the abuses outlined in a State Department report of long-term, frequent "leakage" of U.S. technology. One telling aspect of the report: the U.S. has known about this "leakage" for years, and done nothing about it for "policy" reasons.
The Israelis are now trying to take the offensive on the issue, charging that some in the U.S. are seeking to scuttle the loan guarantees (see below) and sabotage overall U.S.-Israeli relations. There's probably some merit in the argument that the timing of this is not entirely accidental. You will recall that last fall, when the loan guarantees were first proposed, the State Department "suddenly" discovered Israel had been selling advanced weapons technology to South Africa for years.
\[underlined]Loan guarantees. [end underlined] Leahy scheduled a mark-up of the Foreign Ops bill for today (Tuesday), but has also said he will not proceed if the Administration has not signed on to language. As I write this (Monday morning), there is no sign of an agreement. State-Kasten negotiations over the weekend produced nothing but rancor on both sides -- Kasten reportedly left the discussions threatening retaliation over "other foreign policy matters." Bush will sign a letter today saying he will veto the current Leahy-Kasten language -- Leahy asked for that, as back-up in case he does cancel his mark-up. Meanwhile, Byrd has told State (and apparently Leahy) that he will not have a full Committee mark-up of any bill with loan guarantees.

\[underlined] Israeli political situation. [end underlined] With elections scheduled June 23, it's very messy. In Likud's recent convention, Arens worked out a "strange bedfellows" deal with Sharon to vote together and put their people at the top of the Likud slate -- at the expense of the relatively moderate Levy, who had most of his allies relegated to the bottom of the slate. Now Levy is seething, and his people are talking about bolting the party ttached article) . Meanwhile, Rabin is still trying to consolidate his hold on Labor, which is nearly as divided as Likud. Unless one or the other gets a political windfall in the next couple of months (and making a deal on loan guarantees could be that for Shamir), the election will probably produce another even split, with the small parties holding the balance and able to extract a heavy price for their support -- likely meaning more stalemate.

AL
(end of page 2)



(page 3)
(this page is composed of photocopied news clippings)
Likud Lists Arens, Sharon, Then Levy

By MENACHEM SHALEV
FORWARD STAFF

JERUSALEM - It was dubbed "the night of the long knives." Sacred deals were made, broken, modified, remade, then ignored. Lifelong allegiances gave way to crass opportunism. Party leaders were heckled off the podium, branded "traitors" and "criminals."
The Likud, Israel's ruling party, chose its candidates for the upcoming elections this week. It was an experience most party members would rather forget, as quickly as possible.
Ultimately, the grueling and protracted 48-hour party marathon yielded a Likud list for the Knesset that was decidedly more hawkish than its predecessor. There were few new faces, and the first woman on the list was dumped to the No. 30 slot.

Unholy Alliance?
The big loser was Foreign Minister Levy, who only last week garnered an impressive third of the vote in the Likud Central Committee elections for party leader. Mr. Levy, who in the past two years has been the most moderate of Likud ministers, finished a disappointing third in the race for the coveted spot of deputy to the party leader, Yitzhak Shamir, behind Defense Minister Arens and Housing Minister Sharon. Worse yet, most of his Knesset-yearning sup- porters were relegated to the lower portion of the Likud list, and their chances of gaining a Knesset seat are dubious at best.
Mr. Levy's stinging defeat may yet come back to haunt the Likud during the June 23 elections. His supporter's are the grass-roots of Likud activists, and they made no secret of their belief that the Ashkenazi Likud leadership had conspired to humiliate their Sephardi, Moroccan-born leader. In the wake of the internal ballot, many went so far as to declare a switch of allegiance to Labor's Yitzhak Rabin, while others urged Mr. Levy to bolt the Likud and set up his own ethnic, North African party. Mr. Levy, an often petulant and volatile politician, kept his cards close to his chest, but ominously warned the Likud leadership that "the day for settling accounts is sure to come."
Mr. Levy's debacle was the outcome of an internal coalition between Messrs. Arens and Sharon, an eerie partnership that only the Likud tradition for cynical strong-arm tactics could produce. Mr. Sharon has been Mr. Arens' most vocal critic, accusing the defense minister repeatedly of being inept at his job and of "abandoning Jewish lives." Nonetheless, the two joined forces and emerged victorious. Mr. Sharon, who likes nothing better than to command the troops, took over the management of the combined forces, bellowing the soldiers to loyalty and reaping the accolades for a job well done.
In exchange for the support of his followers, who command some 20% of the Committee membership, Mr. Sharon extracted Mr. Arens' agreement to advance the more hawkish leaders of the Likud, who may not be personal followers of Mr. Sharon but tend to side with him on substantive matters. Mr. Sharon even succeeded in getting Mr. Arens to support the first ever Likud candidate who is a permanent resident of the territories, the Ariel mayor, Ron Nahman.

Levy's Stinging Defeat
Contrary to the revolutionary party-wide primaries in the rival Labor party, the Likud chose to stick with its convoluted system of choosing candidates in groups of seven. Twenty years ago, when the system was introduced, it was by far the most democratic in Israeli politics. By now, however, party functionaries have learned the inner secrets of the system and how to best manipulate it to the advantage of the more organized groups within the party. The behind-the-scenes maneuvering reached a peak during this round, to the obvious embarrassment of party leaders who pledged to follow Labor's lead in the next round. The drama in the Likud this week unfolded in four distinct acts, in accordance with the number of "septets" chosen. Each act had its heroes and villains, its victors, losers and scapegoats.
Act 1: The vote for the first septet, or for slots two through eight on the Likud list for the Knesset. At the starting gate were three distinct groups: the Shamir-Arens camp, which include a heavy Liberal component, comprising close to half of the Central Committee; the Levy camp with a third of the delegates, and the Sharon camp with a fifth. At this point, there were no concrete coalitions or deals, although Mr. Levy was insisting that a "conspiracy" was afoot. The results only con- firmed his suspicions: Moshe Arens came first, followed by Ariel Sharon, with Mr. Levy finishing a close third. The next four were all Arens people: the popular transportation minister, Moshe Katsav, the even more popular deputy foreign minister, Binyamin Netanyahu, Member of Knesset Binyamin Zeev Begin and the police minister, Ronnie Milo.
Act 2: Crying betrayal and vowing revenge, the wounded Levy camp regrouped to figure out how to beat the odds. Their salvation came from the camp of the other deputy prime minister, Moshe Nissim. Mr. Nissim, one of Mr. Shamir's closest confidantes, felt betrayed for having been locked out of the first group of seven by his supposed allies, the Shamir- Arens camp. He decided to strike a last-minute deal with Mr. Levy. The Arens and Sharon camps, gloating in their victory in the first round, failed to realize the threat of the new array of forces, and were caught unprepared.
The second septet was a victory of sorts for the new - and short-lived - Levy-Nissim deal: Mr. Nissim was elected to the first slot in the second septet, followed by the popular Knesset speaker, Dov Shilansky, Jewish Agency Treasurer Meir Shitrit (who had also defected to Mr. Levy), Levy stalwart Eliahu Ben Elissar who is chairman of the prestigious Knesset Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee, Health Minister Olmert, the lone Arens representative in this septet, another Levy follower, Dan Tichon, and the independent candidate and cabinet minister, David Magen. Justice Minister Meridor, a favorite of Prime Minister Shamir and an erstwhile candidate for Likud leadership, is overwhelmed by the Levy-Nissim deal and thus not included in the second round.

A Clear Sweep
Act 3: The Arens and Sharon camps enter the second day of voting in a virtual state of panic. They decide to join forces out in the open, and to impose strict discipline on their followers. In the third round, Messrs.. Arens and Sharon read out a prepared list of seven candidates, warning their followers that if the instructions are not carried out to the letter, the camp will meet disaster. The soldiers did as they were told, and the third round provided the new Sharon-Arens axis with a clear-cut victory. Only one of the seven elected in this round, Minister Gideon Patt, was not on their list of recommended seven. Mr. Meridor was first in this group, voted in ironically by supporters of Mr. Sharon, who until recently had branded him a traitor to the cause because of his moderate stands on human rights. In this round, Mr. Sharon starts to get his payoff: It is the most hawkish group of seven yet elected.
Act 4: The Levy group is convinced that their new-found partner, Mr. Nissim, double-crossed them. They decide to go it alone, and the Nissim camp, which has in the meantime burned its bridges with the Arens people, disbands in disarray. Mr. Sharon urges his followers to maintain discipline despite the odds in their favor. A depressed Mr. Levy leaves the ballot grounds, eliciting rumors of a "dramatic announcement" that never came. The result: a clear sweep for the Arens-Sharon camp; not one of the Levy candidates was elected in this fourth and final round.
Epilogue: Labor, of course, was delighted with the tense and bitter aftermath of the internal elections in the Likud. It hopes to gain from the groundswell of anti-Ashkenazi sentiment among Mr. Levy's disgruntled followers. Labor itself will go to the polls on March 31, to select its own list. The Labor vote, in which more than 100,000 voters will participate, will be a dry and dull affair com pared with the Likud storm, Labor hopes that in this case, the lack of melodrama will work in its favor.
(end of page 3)