Ambassador Woolsey Meeting, March 6, 1990
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lead_398_009_all_tr.txt - Transcription (Scripto)
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- Extent (Dublin Core)
- 14 pages
- File Name (Dublin Core)
- lead_398_009_all
- Title (Dublin Core)
- Ambassador Woolsey Meeting, March 6, 1990
- Date (Dublin Core)
- 1990-03-06
- Date Created (Dublin Core)
- 1990-03-06
- Congress (Dublin Core)
- 101st (1989-1991)
- Policy Area (Curation)
- International Affairs
- Creator (Dublin Core)
- Dole, Robert J., 1923-2021
- Record Type (Dublin Core)
- memorandums
- Names (Dublin Core)
- See all items with this valueWoolsey, R. James, 1941-
- Rights (Dublin Core)
- http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/CNE/1.0/
- Language (Dublin Core)
- eng
- Collection Finding Aid (Dublin Core)
- https://dolearchivecollections.ku.edu/index.php?p=collections/findingaid&id=26&q=
- Physical Location (Dublin Core)
- Collection 007, Box 398, Folder 9
- Institution (Dublin Core)
- Robert J. Dole Institute of Politics, University of Kansas, Lawrence, KS
- Archival Collection (Dublin Core)
- Robert J. Dole Republican Leadership Collection, 1985-1996
- Full Text (Extract Text)
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handwritten on top of page: Joyce
BOB DOLE
UNITED STATES SENATE
March 6, 1990
Dear Jim:
Thank you for meeting with me and my colleagues this morning. We appreciated getting an update of the CFE talks, as well as your insights into the dynamics of the CFE negotiating process.
You could probably tell from the number of questions senators had that the CFE negotiations are of great interest here in the Senate. My own view is that a solid, verifiable CFE Treaty is a necessary step in establishing a new, stable security order for the Europe of the 1990s and beyond.
Once again, thank you for attending today's breakfast.
Sincerely,
(signature)
BOB DOLE
United States Senate
The Honorable James Woolsey
CFE Delegation
U.S. Department of State
Room 2422A
2202 C Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20520
handwritten at top of page: Joyce
MEMORANDUM
MARCH 5, 1990
TO: SENATOR DOLE
FROM: MIRA BARATTA
SUBJECT: FINAL COUNT FOR TOMORROW'S BREAKFAST WITH JIM WOOLSEY
The following Senators will be at tomorrow's breakfast:
Burns (check mark; handwritten: 9:15)
Coats (crossed out)
Cochran (will be late) (check mark; handwritten: 8:45)
Domenici (will be late) (check mark; handwritten: 9:15)
Heinz (check mark; handwritten: 8:50)
McClure (check mark)
Stevens (check mark)
Thurmond (crossed out)
Wallop (will be late) (crossed out)
Warner (check mark)
Wilson (crossed out)
--Senator Bond may also drop in late (crossed out)
The following is a proposed seating chart:
Dole
Stevens Woolsey
Thurmond (crossed out) Warner
Heinz McClure
Coats Wilson
Domenici (crossed out; Burns written in) Wallop
Burns (crossed out; Domenici written in) Cochran
I placed the Senators who will be late further down on the table.
If you choose to make opening remarks, I suggest the following points:
-- THE CFE TALKS PRESENT US WITH AN OPPORTUNITY TO:
(1) NAIL DOWN SIGNIFICANT, VERIFIABLE REDUCTIONS IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE.
(2) CREATE A FRAMEWORK FOR A NEW SECURITY ORDER IN EUROPE.
-- SOME SAY THAT EVENTS IN EUROPE HAVE OVERTAKEN THE CFE TALKS, BUT I THINK THAT CFE IS NECESSARY -- WE NEED A FRAMEWORK FOR REDUCTIONS AND FOR CHANGE IN EUROPE.
-- I WOULD LIKE AMBASSADOR JIM WOOLSEY TO OFFER US A STATUS UPDATE ON THE TALKS -- NEW PROPOSALS, ETC. -- AND HIS INSIGHTS INTO THE CHANGES IN EUROPE.
entire page handwritten:
Tuesday, March 6
8:30 a.m.
S-230
1 oatmeal - Dole
Stevens (check mark)
Thurmond (check mark)
Heinz (check mark)
Coats (check mark)
Burns (check mark)
Woolsey
Warner (check mark)
McClure (check mark)
Wilson (check mark)
(9)
Dan
Mira (11)
12 eat
not eat
Domenici
Wallop, Cochran ("15" written and circled)
(8) handwritten on back of page
entire page handwritten:
Dole (check mark)
Stevens (check mark)
Woolsey
Heinz (crossed out; Thurmond written in and check marked)
Heinz
Warner
Coats (check mark; crossed out)
McClure
Wilson
Domenici (crossed out; late)
Domenici stop by
Wallop (late)
Cochran
Burns (?) (crossed out)
Cochran (crossed out) stop by
bond stop by
9 eat
Mira
Dan
*we're waiting to hear from Sens. McClure (crossed out), Thurmond (crossed out), Mack (crossed out) NO
handwritten on back of page: Mattie
handwritten on top of page: Joyce
MEMORANDUM
MARCH 6, 1990
TO: SENATOR DOLE
FROM: MIRA BARATTA
SUBJECT: BREAKFAST WITH JIM WOOLSEY
The following Senators will be at your breakfast tomorrow morning: Burns, Coats, Cochran (will come late), Domenici (will come late) , Heinz, Stevens, Wallop (will come late), Warner and Wilson. We are waiting to hear from Senators McClure, Thurmond and Mack. Senator Bond may come late.
I've informed Woolsey's office that you would like him to give a brief (10 minute) overview following breakfast and then open up for questions.
BACKGROUND: As you know, the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) talks are aimed at reducing NATO and Warsaw Pact forces to lower and equal levels. NATO and the Warsaw Pact have agreed to reduce tanks to 20,000 on each side and armored troop carriers to 28,000 on each side. The agreement will also limit artillery (although the limit has not yet been agreed to ), combat helicopters and aircraft (not yet agreed to). U.S. and Soviet manpower will also be limited.
STATUS: Currently the Conventional Forces in Europe Talks (CFE) are moving more slowly than the pace of events in Europe, which has led many to comment that the negotiations have been overtaken by events. As you know, the Soviets have been asked to leave Czechoslovakia and they are doing so. They will probably be asked to leave other East European countries as well. However, the bulk of Soviet troops are in East Germany (about 360,000), and therefore, the questions of reunification and Germany's future role in Europe loom large over CFE. In addition to the reunification issue, the questions of how to define certain equipment and weapon systems and how to verify production and destruction are difficult and time-consuming matters.
CFE POLITICS: As a result of the rapid and dramatic changes in Eastern Europe, the dynamics of the CFE Talks has changed significantly. In practical terms, what was essentially a bloc to bloc negotiation has evolved into a series of small subgroups that cross bloc lines. For example, the West German negotiators are working with the East German negotiators and the Hungarians are working with various NATO country delegations. The Soviets are somewhat the "odd man out." But, the U.S. delegation is also separated from NATO allies on certain issues, namely related to verification.
VERIFICATION: It is my expectation that the verification regime for CFE will be very loose and will probably rely largely on aerial inspections, rather than on-site inspection (OSI). Our NATO allies don't want other countries (including us) to get a close look at their weapons export industry, so they have opposed measures that would place inspectors at production facilities. In addition, the concurrent negotiations on Open Skies have had the practical effect of lowering CFE verification standards.
OTHER ISSUES:
(1) Troop levels: During the State of the Union, the President proposed lowering troop levels for U.S. and Soviet troops beyond the 275,000 he originally proposed, to 195,000 in Central Europe and an additional 30,000 outside of Central Europe (also known as the Central Zone) for each side. In sum, each side could have a total of 225,000 troops with a subceiling of 195,000 in the Central Zone.
The Soviets did not accept this proposal at the Ministerial, however they did accept a "modified" version of it in Ottawa during the "Open Skies" conference. Their modification, however is the problem. The Soviet position, accepted by Secretary of Baker, is that the U.S. cannot deploy more than 30,000 troops outside the Central Zone -- 30,000 is now a subceiling, as well. In other words, under our original proposal we could have 175,000 in the Central Zone and 50,000 outside the Central Zone, since the the overall limit was 225,000 and the sublimit was 195,000. However, now we are limited to not more than 30,000 outside Central Europe regardless of the numbers in the Central Zone.
Senator Warner, Senator Cohen and Senator Nunn raise this issue with DoD witnesses last week. The SASC is extremely concerned -- with justification -- that we lose all flexibility with respect to troop deployments in Europe under this proposal; this limitation could hinder activities in other theaters, such as the Middle East. It is my understanding that Baker did not fully consult with DoD before accepting the Soviet proposal.
Senator Lugar recognizes the strategic concerns, but he is worried that open discussion of this issue will put pressure on West Germany; Nunn has mentioned the unreliability of West Germany and used the example of the Germans kicking us out when discussing the issue. Lugar does not want this issue to become an excuse for the Democrats to bash West Germany and Chancellor Kohl in particluar.
(2) Combat aircraft: In response to Soviet concerns, the U.S. proposed at the Ministerial that combat trainer aircraft be excluded from limitations on combat aircraft. This will probably complicate verification and may create a "loophole" for combat aircraft.
Attached is an article by the Secretary General of NATO, Manfred Woerner (also former West German Defense Minister), it makes some good points about why we need CFE, particularly as a framework for reductions in conventional forces. He's pretty much on target, except for the verification case which he overstates.
(midway through newspaper article)
He could have run for and easily won the mayoralty of Washington, a war zone passing for an American city. He could then have made demands on the Congress for enforcement and education, exhorted the drug-imperiled kids in need of a role model, and built a reputation of a politician willing to put his future on the line in a great cause.
In short, he coulda been a contender. As an elected official who paid his dues in the trenches, he might have earned a spot on the Presidential ticket in 1992, perhaps the top spot in '96.
But when his moment came, Jesse Jackson choked.
None of that dreary day-to-day responsibility for a man who has tasted adulation at a national convention. Instead, last month's prediction by the columnist A.M. Rosenthal that Jesse would demur proved prescient.
Mr. Jackson fantasizes about being a "shadow senator" against the day that the District might become a State. This pitch for representation by geography rather than population subverts the principle of one person, one vote.
Don't hold your breath waiting for that. First, Staten Island would have to secede from New York City and establish a pattern of electing Republicans. Then it would have to be paired for admission with Democratic D.C., as Hawaii and Alaska were, so that neither party would gain an advantage.
Then, in a decade or two, we might have four unnecessary new senators, necessitating another new Senate Office Building. All because one star thought that serving as mayor was too demeaning an audition.
Now to why his decision to turn tail and run for President again has caused such G.O.P. elation.
Let's project ahead two years. Mario Cuomo will be basing his con- voluted campaign on Vincentian reasoning (only last week, this iconoclastic pol knocked George Washington as a "lousy soldier.")
Al Gore will be older but greener; Bill Bradley, under Sidney Pollack's Hollywood direction, will be slam- dunking third-world debt down voters' throats; and Sam Nunn or Chuck Robb will try to sell an eco- nomic-defense buildup against the Axis powers.
Against that field, Mr. Jackson will do as least as well as last time out in the Iowa caucuses, but probably dip to 10 percent in the New Hampshire primary, getting only the traditional what-the-hell vote, dismissing a Cuomo or Bradley victory as a North- east "hometowner" win.
(first part of sentence cut off) low Republican primary turnout because Bush will be unopposed in 1992, and a big Democratic turnout in a fight for Senator Alan Cranston's seat; that's why Democrats want to put a few propositions on the ballot. California Republicans say no, but
Republicans need you back in 1992.
national leaders want that primary early because of the Jackson factor.
Mr. Jackson won 38 percent of the vote in California in 1988, a state with a black and Hispanic population of 25 percent and a significant gay vote. He may not do as well as last time, but in a five-man white and nonliberal field, Jackson will probably win the nation's largest state.
Super Tuesday follows right on. Jackson will do poorly in Florida, but almost as well as before in Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, North and South Carolina. ("And to my friends in Virginia, I want to say that I never considered General Washington to be a 'lousy soldier,' as my Yankee friend Mr. Koo-mo does.")
By the end of March, 60 percent of the delegates will have been chosen, with Mr. Jackson well out front; in mid-April, he will be the only outsider to challenge Governor Cuomo in the New York primary, and will grab a third of those delegates.
Thus will the Democratic Party be a national laughingstock. Its front- runner cannot be nominated because he chose the fun of national campaigning over the work of local governing; all he can do is threaten to bolt and accuse the party of racism if he is not given the Vice Presidency.
Damned if it does not and deluged if it does, the convention must turn to a serious black elected official: An- drew Young if he is elected governor of Georgia, or Gov. Douglas Wilder of Virginia ("and let me say in defense of my fellow Virginian, General Washington .. . ")
But Democrats already have 90 percent of the black vote. Thanks to Jesse Jackson, the party will spend all 1992 polishing its racial bona fides, while - barring a major recession - the Bush-Quayle ticket breezes in. That's why Republicans are so delighted Jesse turned down a serious job.
THE WASHINGTON POST
MONDAY, MARCH 5, 1990 A11
Manfred Woerner
We Still Need a Conventional Forces Treaty
BRUSSELS-Recent commentaries on both sides of the Atlantic questioning the value of the conventional forces negotiations in Vienna bring to mind the wag's remark that arms control agreements become possible at the moment they are no longer needed. Indeed, some are suggesting that an agreement in Vienna will actually legitimize an unwanted Soviet troop presence in the countries of Central and East- ern Europe. This thinking is far from the mark. Indeed, the pace of East-West relations-and of political change in the East-has made a conventional forces agreement more rather than less necessary.
A CFE agreement is the basis for opening the way to a new European order, politically and militarily. The negotiating table in Vienna is where the interests of the NATO allies, the newly emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union come together in an effort to create a stable and secure situation in Europe, at much lower levels of forces.
We have welcomed Soviet unilateral reductions and will continue to do so. We welcome also the fact that the members of the Warsaw Pact, in an exercise of free self-determination, can decide whether they wish to have Soviet forces on their territory. Where they do not, the Soviets should leave; and we are gratified by the indication they are now going to do so. But this is not the basis for the durable peace we seek.
A CFE Treaty has at least four major advantages. First, only by treaty can we establish the obligation that withdrawn equipment must be destroyed and troops must be demobilized. Under this treaty, we will obtain the destruction of nearly 40,000 Warsaw Pact tanks, enough to pack the highway from Paris to Bonn. More than an equal number of the other items under negotiation-artillery, helicopters, personnel carriers, aircraft-must also be destroyed.
Second, only under the CFE Treaty will such reductions be subject to rigorous verification. Indeed, the extensive verification regime created by the treaty will in and of itself be one of the most important achievements of the negotiations. In addition to verifying compliance, the regime will entail the periodic inspection of 6.5 million square kilometers from the Atlantic to the Urals. This will have a crucial deterrence and confidence-building effect, and pre- vent to a great degree any attempts to mask significant military activity.
Third, it is essential to keep in mind that only by a CFE Treaty can we constrain Soviet forces inside the Soviet Union. Actions taken by the Warsaw Pact governments, and the withdrawals of forces under the now-accepted proposal by President Bush for a Soviet ceiling of 195,000 troops in Europe, will not affect the Soviet forces in the Western Military Districts, except as the Soviet themselves so decide.
And fourth, a CFE agreement will increase Soviet confidence that its legitimate security interests are being respected. The security situation in Europe will be a matter of contractual obligation rather than unilateral action subject to reversal. The framework we have established will also ensure-and this is often forgotten because of our tendency to focus on events in Central Europe-that the reduction of military forces in the Central area does not result in accentuation of confrontation on the flanks of this alliance.
Finally, I can only describe as disingenuous the argument that, by negotiation we are conferring on the Soviet Union the right to maintain forces in Central and Eastern Europe which it otherwise would not have. The negotiations will establish ceilings, and it will be up to participants in the negotiations, including basing countries, to decide how to implement the results. The real question for the Warsaw Pact is whether the Soviet Union is willing to respect the expressed desires of the other members. There is nothing in the treaty ceiling that will prevent a host nation's seeking withdrawal of forces stationed on its territory. And there is of course no requirement in the Treaty or otherwise for countries involved to maintain forces at the ceiling that will be set. What the Treaty will do is ensure that all parties are obligated not to return to the postwar imbalance of forces that threatened our security in Europe.
We have before us opportunities this year to change the face of East-West relations in a concrete and lasting way. I expect that we will have a summit of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe this year that will look to the future, and that, this epoch-making agreement will be signed there. I also expect that we will see a unified Germany, and a redoubled effort by the members of the alliance to build the free, peaceful and undivided Europe we have' sought for so long, in cooperation with our neighbors to the East. The CFE Agreement is an essential cornerstone for this historic task.
The writer is secretary general of NATO.
handwritten at top of page: 12+1
MEMORANDUM
FEBRUARY 27, 1989
TO: SENATOR DOLE
FROM: MIRA BARATTA
SUBJECT: BREAKFAST WITH JIM WOOLSEY
Per your request, I am working with Amb. Woolsey's office to set up a breakfast with Republicans in your office on Tuesday, March 6, at 8:30. The following lists suggestions for the breakfast:
Chafee (check mark; handwritten: NO)
Cohen (check mark; handwritten: NO)
Conrad (handwritten: ? Why?)
Domenici (handwritten: wcb)
Garn (check mark; handwritten: NO)
Kassebaum (check mark; handwritten: NO)
Kasten
Lott (check mark; handwritten: NO)
Lugar (check mark; handwritten: NO)
McCain (check mark; handwritten: NO)
Nickles (handwritten: NO)
Pressler (check mark; handwritten: NO)
Specter (check mark; handwritten: NO)
Stevens (check mark; handwritten: YES)
Wallop (check mark; handwritten: late)
Warner (check mark)
Wilson (check mark; handwritten: YES)
Please check off or add other Senators you wish to invite.
handwritten notes on page:
James - us neg. to conv (illegible) forces in Europe status (CFE)
Dole
Burns
Coats
Stevens
Wilson
Wallop - late
Warner
Gorton
Kasten - NO
Domenici - (drop by) - no breakfast (coffee)
Heinz
Cochran (stop by
Gramm NO
Don
Mira
(Bond stop by)
handwritten on back of page:
Thurmond
Mack
McClure
MEMORANDUM
FEBRUARY 27, 1989
TO: SENATOR DOLE
FROM: MIRA BARATTA
SUBJECT: BREAKFAST WITH JIM WOOLSEY
As you know, I am working with Amb. Woolsey's office to set up a breakfast with Republicans in your office on Tuesday, March 6, at 8:30. In terms of a general format, I suggest the following:
8:30-8:35: Introduction by Senator Dole
8:35-8:50: Eat breakfast
8:50-9:05: Overview briefing on CFE by Ambassador Woolsey
9:05-9:30: Open up for questions/comments by Senators
Is this format O.K. with you? Woolsey's office asked for some guidance.
Yes
No
I received your list of invitees. The name Conrad was a typo, I meant to ask whether or not you wished to invited Senator Conrad Burns, in order to include another freshman Senator (Lott is the only other one). Do you want to invite him?
Yes
No
MEMORANDUM
FEBRUARY 27, 1989
TO: SENATOR DOLE
FROM: MIRA BARATTA
SUBJECT: BREAKFAST WITH JIM WOOLSEY
As you know, I am working with Amb. Woolsey's office to set up a breakfast with Republicans in your office on Tuesday, March 6, at 8:30. In terms of a general format, I suggest the following:
8:30-8:35: Introduction by Senator Dole
8:35-8:50: Eat breakfast
8:50-9:05: Overview briefing on CFE by Ambassador Woolsey
9:05-9:30: Open up for questions/comments by Senators
Is this format O.K. with you? Woolsey's office asked for some guidance.
Yes
No
I received your list of invitees. The name Conrad was a typo, I meant to ask whether or not you wished to invited Senator Conrad Burns, in order to include another freshman Senator (Lott is the only other one). Do you want to invite him?
Yes
No
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