Military Experts Meeting, January 29, 1990
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- Title (Dublin Core)
- Military Experts Meeting, January 29, 1990
- Date (Dublin Core)
- 1990-01-29
- Date Created (Dublin Core)
- 1990-01-29
- Congress (Dublin Core)
- 101st (1989-1991)
- Policy Area (Curation)
- Armed Forces and National Security
- Creator (Dublin Core)
- Dole, Robert J., 1923-2021
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- correspondence
- attendance lists
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- http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/CNE/1.0/
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- eng
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- https://dolearchivecollections.ku.edu/index.php?p=collections/findingaid&id=26&q=
- Physical Location (Dublin Core)
- Collection 007, Box 397, Folder 9
- Institution (Dublin Core)
- Robert J. Dole Institute of Politics, University of Kansas, Lawrence, KS
- Archival Collection (Dublin Core)
- Robert J. Dole Republican Leadership Collection, 1985-1996
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(page 1)
MEMORANDUM
JANUARY 29, 1989
TO: SENATOR DOLE
FROM: MIRA BARATTA
SUBJECT: NOTES FROM MEETING WITH MILITARY EXPERTS
Attached are the notes from this morning's meeting with military experts. Per your request, I will send them to the Senators who participated.
(page 2)
NOTES FROM MEETING WITH MILITARY EXPERTS
JANUARY 29, 1990
OFFICE OF SENATOR BOB DOLE
MILITARY EXPERTS
General Russell E. Dougherty
McGuire, Woods, Battle and Boothe
Ambassador Robert Ellsworth
Robert Ellsworth and Company
General Andrew Goodpaster
Chairman, The Atlantic Council of the U.S.
General William Odom
The Hudson Institute
General Bernard Rogers
Trustee, Institute for Defense Analysis
Admiral Harry Train
Strategic Research and Management Services
SENATORS:
Bob Dole
Pete Domenici
Jim McClure
Don Nickles
Harry Reid
Chuck Robb
Malcolm Wallop
John Warner
Pete Wilson
(page 3)
OPENING REMARKS
General Goodpaster: Three points to make: (1) The amount, tempo, and unpredictability of changes could mean fundamental changes for our security posture. (2) The unpredictability of change suggests that it would make sense to focus on the mid-term; unlikely that we will see change in institutions, such as NATO, CSCE by then, so it would be best to hold on to those institutions at least until the mid-90s. (3) Then (in the mid-90s) we should consider dimensions of change in our defense structure and take a look at rather substantial changes. Suggested that we look at impact of 25%, 40% cut in U.S. defense budget and 50% of current U.S. troop levels in Europe, as part of developing a basis for a strategic plan beyond the mid-90s. In sum, we need to know, what to do, how to do it, and what to do it with.
General Odom: Five points to make: (1) The Soviet military threat is changing, but it is less clear how it is changing. Officially, the Soviets are changing from an emphasis on quantity to quality, however, the new requirements seem way above the Soviets' capabilities. (2) Soviet threat will not disappear (3) Although there may be a decline in Soviet support for Third World insurgencies, this will probably not limit Third World insurgencies. (4) How we manage German power in Europe will be more important than how we manage the Soviets. We need to build-up an "Atlantic House", rather than a "European House" as Gorbachev has urged. (5) Finally, we need to ask whether EC in '92 will happen without NATO. We need to look at the relationship between economics and security in Europe.
Admiral Train: We need to make sure that we do not take irreversible actions. Some want to cash in on the "peace dividend", but Train urges caution against taking actions we can't reverse. Train quoted a London paper, "how dangerous it is to be in a river when the ice is breaking up." Danger of the lebanonization of the Soviet Union. Since the early 60s we have based our forces on the Soviet threat, if that no longer applies, U.S. forces can be used and U.S. forces were used for many other things. Other U.S. interests will not go away, even if the Soviet threat does. We cannot repeat the mistake of the '40s: that led to the Korean War. Moreover, we have to be careful not to be swept up in Moscow's rhetoric -- the situation there (in the Soviet Union) is bleak. With regard to cuts, if you are going to cut, cut bases with force structure.
(page 4)
General Dougherty: Started with quote "We must not make our mistakes in a hurry." In 1945, the U.S. cut back its forces, and we were back into war 5 years later. The Soviet threat may be going away, but not sure; "hard core" forces still there. Expectations in the Soviet Union will destroy the leader that can't fulfill them. We need to ask, "how little is enough?" and keep in mind that there are other threats. Called attention to the 1988 study done by Fred Ikle (Discriminate Deterrence). It's time to do such a study again -- by a bipartisan group.
General Rogers: "It is time for the country to call time-out." The United States needs to: (1) define its vital national interests in priority; (2) define what risks are involved to protect those interests; (3) create a strategy to protect those interests; (4) determine what tools are necessary to accomplish this strategy. "If I were a Senator, that is what I would ask for." General Rogers priorities: (1) Need to be ready to move quickly -- need light mobile forces and lift capability; (2) Strategic nuclear forces -- stop B-2, emphasize SLBMs, and support both MX and Midgetman; (3) Troops -- emphasize readiness of residual forces; (4) Research and Development (R&D) -- of increased importance in an era of reduced forces; (5) Modernization (6) Force structure.
Ambassador Ellsworth: Notes attached.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Senator Warner: So far, Cheney has just given everyone a little "haircut." But, what will happen in the Congress? Every year we just manage to win. This year the forces will be against us. We will be driven by the realities of the day -- public opinion. It will be a tough battle, I hope the Senate will be able to stand tall against the avalanche.
Senator Robb: My thoughts track almost precisely with Senator Warner's. We need a strategic look, but politically, there is enormous pressure to go beyond. Need to expedite the process by which we can achieve a strategic look. Regarding how to use defense savings, Robb prefers deficit reduction, however, pressure will be to spend those dollars elsewhere. Need to find place to compromise now.
Senator Domenici: What is the instrument by which we can do such an analysis? The situation is constantly changing, there seems to be no way to do it.
(page 5)
General Rogers: The Administration is only looking two days ahead in its planning. But, the resources are there (to take a strategic look). If you can't get it from the Administration, go to federally funded research centers.
Senator Warner: In fairness to Dick (Cheney), the Defense Department is currently working on a five year defense plan.
Senator Wallop: Cheney started on the wrong foot. With no (Administration) idea everyone's idea will be O.K. This creates an amorphous situation which is a real threat.
General Goodpaster: Take arbitrary alternatives and work them out. Need some sense of dimension.
Senator Dole: The process without some strategy is and will be ad hoc.
Senator McClure: I am not so worried about five years from now, but one year from now. Soviet objectives may have changed, but their means haven't changed. What if the Soviet leadership changes? What do we do between now and the mid-90s?
General Odom: With regard to perestroika, the issue is how and when it will fail. No liberal development is possible with an ethnic colonial empire. There are unstable conditions in leadership. Even if there is a new General Secretary, I don't see a reassertion of the old threat, in terms of a military build-up. However, there is another scenario. There is euphoria in Eastern Europe now, but there are problems facing the regimes in Eastern Europe which may lead to a lebanonization of Eastern Europe. Public opinion is firm with regard to our presence in Europe.
Senator McClure: My concern is Congress which manipulates emotions; I am afraid that in two years we may decimate our forces.
Senator Dole: The media will show the biggest "cutters"; how do we tell our stories?
Senator Nickles: I don't want us to go to zero (in Europe) as the Soviets seem to be pushing in their new proposal.
General Rogers: Europeans want U.S. troops in Europe. If we reduce to 50% we will need a new strategy for the mission of deterrence. This the SACEUR will have to do.
(page 6)
Senator Warner: If there is a crisis in (Eastern) Europe what will NATO's role be?
General Odom: NATO will have not choice, but to be involved.
General Goodpaster: NATO's commitment does not extend to Eastern Europe.
General Dougherty: We need to adhere to Bill Crowe's judgment -- the first law of the wingwalker: have a grip on something else before you let go of the wing.
Senator Reid: The tenor of this conversation is different than that of other conversations I have been exposed to until now. Unless a message goes out now, actions will be taken that will make your hair stand on end. I am happy to hear that we need to protect services for our military, we have a medical center in Nevada. We also have the Nevada test site.
General Goodpaster: As long as you have nuclear weapons stockpiled, you need to test.
Senator Reid: That's my speech, I have been saying that. Until now, excluding last year when he didn't offer his amendment, Kennedy's test ban amendment has gotten around 33 votes, but each year it has creeped upward. Now with perestroika ....
General Goodpaster: Nuclear safety continues to be an issue. Nothing is more important to nuclear safety and security than nuclear testing.
General Dougherty: All of us here (military experts) have had our hands on nuclear weapons. All of us were scared of a testing ban and reliance on extrapolated data.
Admiral Train: When I was in the Soviet Union, the Soviets kept trying to pressure on SDI, the Navy and nuclear testing. There must be something to these things if they keep pressing.
General Dougherty: Just keep saying the same thing.
Senator McClure: Weapons modernization is a problem. SIS (Special Isotope Separation process) is dead. Watkins killed it. We won't be able to get modernization in today's situation.
BOB DOLE
UNITED STATES SENATE
February 1, 1990
Dear Bernie:
Thank you for participating in Monday's breakfast meeting with experts and senators. My colleagues and I found the meeting informative and useful, especially since changing the direction of U.S. defense policy will be a difficult task.
It was reassuring to me that the group reached a consensus on the fundamental need for a strategy prior to restructuring our forces. Moreover, I found your suggestions about how to devise a new U.S. strategy for the 1990's particularly interesting and helpful.
Once again, thank you for your participation in Monday's meeting.
Sincerly,
(signature)
BOB DOLE
United States Senate
General Bernard W. Rogers (Ret.)
1467 Hampton Ridge Drive
McLean, VA 22101
(page 8)
BOB DOLE
UNITED STATES SENATE
January 31, 1990
Dear Bob:
Thank you for your help in arranging Monday's breakfast with military experts. I think that this meeting was as interesting and informative as the last one. The other senators were equally impressed with the group's insights and recommendations.
Once again, thanks for the great idea and the help in pulling it together.
Sincerely,
(signature)
BOB DOLE
United States Senate
Ambassador Robert Ellsworth
Robert Ellsworth and Company
2001 L Street., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(page 9)
BOB DOLE
UNITED STATES SENATE
February 1, 1990
Dear Andy:
Thank you for participating in Monday's breakfast meeting with military experts and senators. My colleagues and I found the meeting informative and useful, especially since changing the direction of U.S. defense policy will be a difficult task.
It was reassuring to me that the group reached a consensus on the fundamental need for a strategy prior to restructuring our forces. Moreover, I found your insights into how to approach U.S. defense policy in the 1990's particularly thought-provoking.
Once again, thank you for your participation in Monday's meeting.
Sincerely,
(signature)
BOB DOLE
United States Senate
General Andrew J. Goodpaster
Chairman
The Atlantic Council of the U.S.
1616 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
(page 10)
BOB DOLE
UNITED STATES SENATE
February 1, 1990
Dear Bill:
Thank you for participating in Monday's breakfast meeting with military experts and senators. My colleagues and I found the meeting informative and useful, especially since changing the direction of U.S. defense policy will be a difficult task.
It was reassuring to me that the group reached a consensus on the fundamental need for a strategy prior to restructuring our forces. Moreover, I found your insights into Soviet internal politics particularly thought-provoking.
Once again, thank you for your participation in Monday's meeting.
Sincerely,
(signature)
BOB DOLE
United States Senate
General William Odom
The Hudson Institute
4401 Ford Avenue
Alexandria, VA 22302
(page 11)
BOB DOLE
UNITED STATES SENATE
February 1, 1990
Dear Russ:
Thank you for participating in Monday's breakfast meeting with military experts and senators. My colleagues and I found the meeting informative and useful, especially since changing the direction of U.S. defense policy will be a difficult task.
It was reassuring to me that the group reached a consensus on the fundamental need for a strategy prior to restructuring our forces. Moreover, I found your suggestions about a bipartisan commission to study strategy options, particularly interesting and timely.
Once again, thank you for your participation in Monday's meeting.
Sincerely,
(signature)
BOB DOLE
United States Senate
General Russel E. Dougherty
McGuire Woods Battle & Boothe
8280 Greensboro Drive
Suite 900, Tysons Corner
P.O Box 9346
McLean, VA 22101
(page 12)
BOB DOLE
UNITED STATES SENATE
February 1, 1990
Dear Harry:
Thank you for participating in Monday's breakfast meeting with military experts and senators. My colleagues and I found the meeting informative and useful, especially since changing the direction of U.S. defense policy will be a difficult task.
It was reassuring to me that the group reached a consensus on the fundamental need for a strategy prior to restructuring our forces. Moreover, I found your insights into the Soviet foreign policy agenda and the potential for the "lebanonization" of the Soviet Union, particularly interesting.
Once again, thank you for your participation in Monday's meeting.
Sincerely,
(signature)
BOB DOLE
United States Senate
Adm. Harry D. Train
Strategic Research and Management Services
100 West Plume
Suite 313
Norfolk, VA 23510
(page 13)
BOB DOLE
KANSAS
United States Senate
OFFICE OF THE REPUBLICAN LEADER
WASHINGTON, DC 20510
MONDAY, JANUARY 29, 1990
BREAKFAST MEETING WITH MILITARY EXPERTS
9:00 A.M. - S-230
OUTSIDE PARTICIPANTS:
General Andrew J. Goodpaster
Chairman
The Atlantic Council of the U.S.
Admiral Harry D. Train
Strategic Research & Management Services
General Russell E. Dougherty
McGuire Woods Battle & Boothe
General William Odom
The Hudson Institute
General Bernard W. Rogers
Trustee, Institute for Defense Analyses
Ambassador Bob Ellsworth
Robert Ellsworth & Co.
SENATORS INVITED:
(handwritten line) Dole
Bryan - tentative yes
(handwritten line) Domenici
Heflin - will call back
(crossed out) Kasten
(handwritten line) McClure
(handwritten line) Nickles
Reid
(handwritten line) Robb
(handwritten line) Wallop
(handwritten line) Warner
(handwritten line) Wilson
(page 14)
BIOGRAPHIES OF MILITARY EXPERTS
MEETING ON U.S. DEFENSE POLICY IN THE 1990s
January 29, 1990
RUSSELL E. DOUGHERTY
General Dougherty, Commander and Chief, Strategic Air Command 1974-1977, is currently the Editor of Air Force Magazine and is Of Counsel at Boothe, Prichard & Dudley. His Air Force career spans 30 years, with principal assignments including Chief of Staff, NATO's Allied Command Europe (1974-1977); Commander, 2nd/8th Air Force (1971-1972); Deputy Chief of Plans and Operations, USAF (1969-1971), and tours of duty in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the NSC. General Dougherty is a Trustee of the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) and a member of the Defense Science Board.
ROBERT F. ELLSWORTH
Ambassador Ellsworth is Chairman and President of Robert Ellsworth and Company, an international consulting firm. A former Member of Congress (1961-1967), he served as the U.S. Ambassador to NATO from 1969-1971. Ambassador Ellsworth held the position of Assistant Secretary of Defense (1974-1975) as well as Deputy Secretary of Defense (1975-1977). He has written numerous articles on the subjects of U.S. - European relations, U.S. security policy and the defense budget.
ANDREW J. GOODPASTER
Lieutenant General Goodpaster, a graduate of West Point, holds a PhD. in International Relations from Princeton. He is currently the Chairman of the Atlantic Council of the United States. General Goodpaster was the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, 1969-1974. He was the Director of Special Studies, Office of the Army Chief of Staff (1967), and was the Commandant of The National War College in 1968. General Goodpaster was the Deputy Commander of the U.S. Military Assistance Command in Vietnam 1968.
(page 15)
WILLIAM E. ODOM
Lieutenant General Odom is currently the Director of National Security Studies for the Hudson Institute and an adjunct professor at Yale University. From 1985 to 1988, General Odom was the Director of the National Security Agency and responsible for the agency's work in signals intelligence and communications security. From 1981 to 1985, General Odom served as Deputy Assistant and then Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence. During the Carter Administration, General Odom was a senior member of the National Security Council Staff and military assistant to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, Zbigniew Brzezinski (1977-1981). General Odom has written widely on Soviet political and military affairs.
BERNARD W. ROGERS
Born in Kansas, General Rogers graduated from West Point in 1943 and studied at Oxford as a Rhodes Scholar 1947-1950. He was the U.S. Army Chief of Staff (1976-1979) and the Supreme Allied Commander (1979 to 1987) during which time the United States deployed the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) in Western Europe as part of its dual track policy (in 1987, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. signed the INF Treaty). A battalion commander in the Korean War in 1952, General Rogers served as Assistant Division Commander, 1st Infantry Division in Vietnam 1966-1967, and as the Commanding General of the 5th Army Division 1969-1970. He is now a Consultant to the Coca-Cola Company, and General Dynamics Corporation, and a trustee of the Institute of Defense Analyses.
HARRY D. TRAIN II
Admiral Train graduated from the Naval Academy in 1949 and has over 30 years of Naval experience. He was the Commander of the 6th Fleet in 1976, and was assigned as Supreme Allied Commander, Ocean Sea Area, Atlantic in 1978. He was the Commanding Officer of the USS Conyngham (DDG-17) in 1967 and served on the staffs of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (1969-1971). He was assigned to the Office of the Secretary of Defense as Director of the East Asia and Pacific Region (1973), and was the Director of Systems Analysis in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations 1973-1974. Admiral Train is presently an Executive Vice President with Strategic Research and Management Services.
(page 16)
TALKING POINTS FOR INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS
* THANK YOU FOR COMING HERE THIS MORNING TO DISCUSS THE CRITICAL ISSUE OF U.S. DEFENSE POLICY IN THE 1990s.
* WE ARE WITNESSING MANY DRAMATIC CHANGES IN EASTERN EUROPE AND AROUND THE GLOBE.
* WE ARE IN A PERIOD OF TRANSITION AND WE DON'T KNOW HOW LONG THAT TRANSITION WILL BE, NOR WHAT DANGERS THERE MIGHT BE.
* SO, THE QUESTION WE ARE FACED WITH IS:
HOW DO WE RESPOND WITH RESPECT TO:
-- OUR DEFENSE BUDGET
-- OUR ALLIANCE RELATIONSHIPS
-- OUR ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS?
* WE ARE ALSO CONFRONTED WITH THE ISSUE OF WHETHER OR NOT THE CHANGES WE ARE SEEING ARE REVERSIBLE.
* IN MY VIEW, WHILE IT WOULD PROBABLY NOT BE FISCALLY WISE TO INCREASE OUR DEFENSE SPENDING, IT WOULD NOT BE MILITARILY WISE TO GUT THE STRONG DEFENSE WE BUILT IN THE 1980s.
* CLEARLY, THE THREAT OF A CONVENTIONAL WAR IN EUROPE IS DECREASING.
* WE NEED TO DEFINE OUR ROLE IN EUROPE, WITHIN NATO.
* HOWEVER, IN THE 1990s, THE UNITED STATES WILL ALSO FACE NEW THREATS, SUCH AS THE PROLIFERATION OF BALLISTIC MISSILES AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS, DRUG WARS AND TERRORISM.
* WE NEED TO PLAN FOR THOSE NEW CONTINGENCIES -- WITH NEW POLICIES, NEW TECHNOLOGIES, SUCH AS SDI, AND NEW TRAINING FOR OUR MILITARY.
* ON THE ARMS CONTROL FRONT, I BELIEVE WE SHOULD SEEK REDUCTIONS THROUGH VERIFIABLE TREATIES, RATHER THAN BY UNILATERAL ACTION.
-- ACHIEVING A CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT AT THE CFE TALKS IN VIENNA MAY BE A DIFFICULT TASK SINCE EVENTS IN EUROPE ARE MOVING SO QUICKLY -- WE HAVE TO ASK IF OUR POSITION IS STILL RELEVANT.
-- ON THE OTHER HAND, WHAT REMAINS RELATIVELY CONSTANT IS THE STRATEGIC BALANCE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION, SO IN MY VIEW, OUR START POSITION IS STILL ON TARGET.
* IN SUMMARY, THERE ARE MANY QUESTIONS AND FEW ANSWERS TO DATE. I HOPE THIS DISCUSSION WILL HELP US COME UP WITH SOME IDEAS, AND MAYBE SOME ANSWERS.
(page 17)
(handwritten)
New York Times
6-28-87
Sect. IV / pg. 25
(end handwritten)
(political cartoon of 5 subsequent images. On the farthest left is a missile launcher and the farthest right is a man holding a slingshot with the middle three being the transition and a man onlooking from a fence)
Why Compromise Our Deterrent Strength in Europe?
By Bernard W. Rogers
MONS, Belgium
Military strength and political will are both necessary for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to deter aggression, but the alliance has also long recognized the need for dialogue with the Soviet Union. (highlighted) A central element of NATO's approach is arms control.
NATO's strength, however, is threatened by a recent proposal in the talks on intermediate-range nuclear forces. The plan would eliminate the longer-range missiles in this category and reduce short-range weapons on each side. Such a move would harm the credibility of our deterrence, the ability to prevent aggression.
I have held that position for six years, since the plan was first put on the negotiating table. Arms control must not be an end in itself, and political leaders should guard against the natural tendency to seek short-term political success at the price of increasing military risk in the long run. (end highlighted)
Deterrence is in the mind of the beholder - the Soviet Union. The Russians must perceive that any aggression against the West will result in more pain than gain for them.
NATO decided to deploy (highlighted) land-based, long-range I.N.F. missiles in 1979 to fill a gap in our spectrum of deterrence. The gap existed because American F-111 aircraft based in Britain were then the last remaining part of the theater nuclear system that could reach Soviet soil, provided the aircraft could penetrate Warsaw Pact air defenses. The fact that the Russians began deploying SS-20 missile's in 1977 made the NATO decision more urgent.
Removing the land-based intermediate-range nuclear forces now would return NATO to its weak, pre-1979 posture. In fact, because the (end highlighted) Russians have continued to improve their conventional and nuclear forces, NATO would be in an even worse position now.
(highlighted) To establish credible deterrence. two capabilities, listed in NATO's guidelines for using nuclear weapons, are vital: the ability to strike, with certainty, targets deep in the Soviet homeland (only Pershing 2 missiles meet this requirement), and a number of nuclear escalatory options between conventional forces and the use of strategic nuclear forces.
The proposed I.N.F. agreement would eliminate the Pershing 2 missiles and thereby remove the first capability. It would also eliminate a crucial escalatory option. The result would be a reduction in the credibility of NATO's deterrence.(end highlighted)
Nonetheless, the I.N.F. proposal has been promoted by NATO political officials for the last six years, even though a number of them recognized, after the Reykjavik summit meeting. the folly of having done so.
How can allied governments now tell their people that they made a mistake, that they did not expect the Russians to agree to the reductions? Right or wrong, there will most likely be an agreement (assuming verification procedures are worked out) on eliminating long-range I.N.F. weapons. Political credibility - admittedly important - of governments, parties and national leaders will thus have assumed a higher priority than the credibility of our deterrence. What NATO must do now is to bolster that credibility.
A solution aimed toward that objective would include three points: linking the elimination of the remaining longer-range I.N.F. weapons to a satisfactory agreement on conventional and chemical weapons; reaching a lower and balanced level of shorter-range weapons by converting Pershing 2 missiles to shorter-range Pershing IB's; retaining the 72 Pershing IA's and their warheads in West Germany to balance the 600 Soviet Scud missiles aimed at Europe.
Although the elimination of our Pershing 2 missiles would prevent NATO from attacking Soviet targets quickly and with certainty, at least the Pershing IA's and IB's would let us strike targets located in western Poland, East Germany and Czechoslovakia.
Some people may assert that what I have suggested is infeasible. But if the Russians are as fearful of the Pershing 2's as it appears, and if they are prepared to pay the price to eliminate them, why should we pre-emptively concede that they won't accept such proposals? At least, let's try.
Throughout the arms control debate, I have been concerned by glib rationales presented by people who try to justify the so-called zero-zero plan, which would eliminate some intermediate-range and short-range weapons.
One rationale is, "Aren't the 4,600 warheads in Europe enough for adequate deterrence?" (This number was mandated at a NATO defense ministers meeting in 1983. Often overlooked is the fact that NATO has reduced its nuclear warheads from 7,000, unilaterally, since 1979.)
That is the wrong question. it should be. "Once the 572 long-range I.N.F. warheads are eliminated, what is the composition of the remaining warheads?" They consist of a few maritime depth charges (range 0). many artillery shells (9.5 miles), 95 Lance missiles (72 miles), 72 West German Pershing IA's (450 miles) and bombs for dual-capable aircraft, which can carry conventional and nuclear bombs.
Given the necessity to set artillery and the Lance missile systems well behind the forward edge of the battle in order to protect them from enemy fire, only the West German Pershing IA's can strike with certainty deep into non-Soviet Warsaw Pact territory. Our aircraft are limited in the range they can travel and by Warsaw Pact air defenses.
So it is more than just numbers of warheads involved. The real questions are: "Does NATO have the appropriate systems to hit targets we need to hold at risk, and do the Soviets know we can do it?"
Another rationale often heard is, "Since the Russians are giving up more warheads than NATO, this has to be a good deal for the West." Again, it is not numbers that matter. The Russians would lose only a very small fraction of their capability to strike Western Europe since every one of the thousands of Soviet warheads remaining, including intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, can still reach Western European soil.
(highlighted) On the other hand, the I.N.F. agreement would deny NATO the very weapon most feared by the Soviet Union - the Pershing 2 - and thus the most effective deterrent, thereby reducing the credibility of our overall deterrence and creating zones of unequal security in the alliance. (end highlighted)
A third rationale is, "NATO can use the submarine-launched ballistic missiles committed to the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe." While this is technically feasible, I believe it is politically infeasible today, as it was in 1977 to 1979, when NATO governments protested strongly against using "strategic" weapons for theater nuclear purposes. Moreover, although the Russians can discriminate between the launching of land-based ballistic missiles and the launching of submarine-based ballistic missiles, they cannot tell whether those being launched from submarines are part of the Supreme Allied Commander's limited inventory or from the American or British strategic nuclear inventory. Thus, they cannot know whether the West has begun an all-out nuclear attack.
Finally, a zero-zero accord would require NATO to bolster the credibility of its deterrence. The most critical step would be to improve conventional forces by exploiting our technological superiority - for example, with the so-called follow-on forces attack program.
Dual-capable aircraft must be protected from elimination no matter how enticing Mikhail S. Gorbachev's potential offer in this category may seem. We can protect them by hardening shelters, improving the aircraft defenses and their ability to penetrate Warsaw pact air defenses.
NATO must also modernize its nuclear capability. as NATO defense ministers recommended in 1983, long before an I.N.F. accord seemed possible. This means developing a new air-to-surface Standoff missile and a follow-on to the Lance missile, improved artillery fired atomic projectiles and completion of the Trident submarine programs.
(highlighted) A strong NATO is the West's best guarantee for a future of peace at the lowest possible level of risk. Arms control agreements that enhance our Security and maintain a credible deterrence can reduce risks. But agreements made solely to boost the political objectives of NATO officials will reduce NATO's capability to deter the Russians. NATO must not sacrifice long-term deterrence for short-term political expediency. (end highlighted)
The United States and its allies should evaluate very carefully, and honestly, the long-term consequences of arms proposals. No pact should be signed today that NATO countries will regret tomorrow - when current political leaders are no longer in power - leaving our people, especially in Western Europe, to live with the results.
(bottom left corner and high lighted) Bernard W. Rogers retired last week as Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, a position the general held for the last eight years. (end highlighted)
After the Waldheim Visit
By Jacqueline G. Wexler
For more than a quarter of a century. I have cherished the actions of Pope John XXIII and Vatican Council II for exorcising the devil of anti-Semitism from our great faith tradition.
In the ensuing years, great strides have been made to rid our liturgy and our theology of substantive and linguistic content that explicitly or implicitly fostered anti-Semitism.
It is precisely because of these decades of positive decisions and direction that Jews and many Roman Catholics are not only pained but also incredulous that Pope John Paul II chose to receive President Kurt Waldheim of Austria in an official state visit and seems not to have used the visit to exhort him toward public contrition for his Nazi affiliations.
Many church leaders and Catholic laymen had held some hope he would do so.
Many had also hoped that the Holy Father, as universal pastor, would have used the occasion to exhort Austrian Catholics to purge themselves of the substantive and symbolic anti-Semitism that has had a long and dark history in Austria. This seems not to have happened.
What do we do now?
I plead with my fellow Catholics to understand the deep anger and anguish of the Jewish people at what appears to be a retrogression to a laissez-faire posture of the official church in the era of the Holocaust.
1 plead with my Jewish brothers and sisters not to slam the doors of dialogue shut, whatever their frustrations and fears.
All human beings, including popes, make mistakes of judgment.
The pattern of actions.in Jewish-Catholic relations of John Paul II is far more positive than negative. Let us work together to reopen and deepen the dialogue.
Humility and courage are two sides of a single coin. The Pope and the hierarchy and Jewish leaders along with all Jews and Catholics will need both humility and courage.
(page 18)
MEMORANDUM
JANUARY 25, 1989
TO: SENATOR DOLE
FROM: MIRA BARATTA
SUBJECT: BREAKFAST MEETING WITH MILITARY EXPERTS
Attached is the list of participants and their biographies, as well as talking points for Monday's breakfast meeting. It is my expectation that the discussion will probably focus on the question of the U.S. role in Europe, especially within the context of NATO. Related to that is the issue of U.S. troop levels and the role of tactical nuclear weapons and other nuclear systems in NATO strategy.
On the issue of troop levels, there is an increasing question of relevance of the Western proposal at the Conventional Forces in Europe talks (CFE), especially with regard to establishing a ceiling on U.S. and Soviet troop levels. Most of the Warsaw Pact nations want the Soviets out completely, so some fear this ceiling, may become a floor.
Once can argue convincingly that the Soviets view the CFE talks as a way to legitimize a substantial Soviet presence in Eastern Europe (Senator Wallop had an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal that made this point). The larger issue, though, is how to contend with this situation; Wallop wants us to leave the talks, but maybe we just need to change tactics and our proposal in some way.
With respect to the U.S. presence, most Allied governments view U.S. troops in Europe as a stabilizing factor. General Goodpaster made a big splash in the news last spring when he advocated that the Western proposal seek 50% cuts in U.S. and NATO forces and urged that NATO seriously look at unilateral reductions in forces should the Soviets change or reduce their forces.
With respect to the role of nuclear weapons in NATO strategy, as you know it is highly unlikely that the West Germans would agree to the modernization of short-range nuclear forces (SNF). And, in general West European public opinion would probably oppose such a move as a result of their perception that the threat from the Soviet Union has diminished considerably or disappeared. General Rogers did not support the INF Treaty because he believes that nuclear weapons should play a key role in NATO's strategy of "flexible response" (attached is an op-ed he wrote on this subject).
Another area that may be discussed is that of possible change in Soviet military doctrine. General Odom, former head of NSA, is also a Soviet expert. He may be able to discuss whether or not there is evidence of a change in Soviet strategy and military thinking. Finally, the issue of whether there is evidence of permanent changes in Soviet force structure is key to the U.S. evaluation of the "threat" (as you know, this should drive the dollars for our defense budget). Of course, we need to address new emerging threats such as chemical and ballistic missile proliferation.
(page 19)
BOB DOLE
KANSAS
United States Senate
OFFICE OF THE REPUBLICAN LEADER
WASHINGTON, DC 20510
MONDAY, JANUARY 29, 1990
BREAKFAST MEETING WITH MILITARY EXPERTS
9:00 A.M. - S-230
OUTSIDE PARTICIPANTS:
(handwritten check mark) General Andrew J. Goodpaster
Chairman
The Atlantic Council of the U.S.
(handwritten check mark) Admiral Harry D. Train
Strategic Research & Management Services
(handwritten check mark) General Russell E. Dougherty
McGuire Woods Battle & Boothe
(handwritten check mark) General William Odom
The Hudson Institute
(handwritten check mark) General Bernard W. Rogers
Trustee, Institute for Defense Analyses
(handwritten check mark) Ambassador Bob Ellsworth
Robert Ellsworth & Co.
SENATORS INVITED:
(handwritten check mark) Dole
(crossed out) Bryan - tentative yes (handwritten) no (end handwritten)
(handwritten check mark) Domenici (handwritten) -will arrive at 9:30 (end handwritten)
(crossed out) Heflin - will call back
(crossed out) Kasten
(handwritten check mark) McClure
(handwritten check mark) Nickles
Reid
(handwritten check mark) Robb
(handwritten check mark) Wallop
(handwritten check mark) Warner
(handwritten check mark) Wilson
(handwritten)
(check mark) MIRA BARATTA
(check mark) DAN STANLEY
(end handwritten)
(page 20)
BOB DOLE
KANSAS
United States Senate
OFFICE OF THE REPUBLICAN LEADER
WASHINGTON, DC 20510
MONDAY, JANUARY 29, 1990
BREAKFAST MEETING WITH MILITARY EXPERTS
9:00 A.M. - S-230
OUTSIDE PARTICIPANTS:
General Andrew J. Goodpaster
Chairman
The Atlantic Council of the U.S.
Admiral Harry D. Train
Strategic Research & Management Services
General Russell E. Dougherty
McGuire Woods Battle & Boothe
General William Odom
(handwritten) The Hudson Institute (end handwritten)
General Bernard W. Rogers
(handwritten) Trustee, Institute For Defense Analyses (end handwritten)
Ambassador Bob Ellsworth
(handwritten) Robert Ellsworth & Co. (end handwritten)
SENATORS INVITED:
(handwritten check mark) Dole - yes
Bryan - (crossed out) will call back
Domenici - (crossed out) yes (handwritten) arrive 9:30 a.m. (end handwritten)
(crossed out) Heflin - will call back
(crossed out) Kasten - yes
McClure - yes
(handwritten check mark) Nickles - yes
Reid - yes
(handwritten check mark) Robb - yes
(handwritten check mark) Wallop - yes
Warner - yes
Wilson - yes
(page 21)
BIOGRAPHIES OF MILITARY EXPERTS
MEETING ON U.S. DEFENSE POLICY IN THE 1990s
January 29, 1990
RUSSELL E. DOUGHERTY
General Dougherty, Commander and Chief, Strategic Air Command 1974-1977, is currently the Editor of Air Force Magazine and is Of Counsel at Boothe, Prichard & Dudley. His Air Force career spans 30 years, with principal assignments including Chief of Staff, NATO's Allied Command Europe (1974-1977) ; Commander, 2nd/8th Air Force (1971-1972); Deputy Chief of Plans and Operations, USAF (1969-1971), and tours of duty in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the NSC. General Dougherty is a Trustee of the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) and a member of the Defense Science Board.
ROBERT F. ELLSWORTH
Ambassador Ellsworth is Chairman and President of Robert Ellsworth and Company, an international consulting firm. A former Member of Congress (1961-1967), he served as the U.S. Ambassador to NATO from 1969-1971. Ambassador Ellsworth held the position of Assistant Secretary of Defense (1974-1975) as well as Deputy Secretary of Defense (1975-1977). He has written numerous articles on the subjects of U.S. - European relations, U.S. security policy and the defense budget.
ANDREW J. GOODPASTER
Lieutenant General Goodpaster, a graduate of West Point, holds a PhD. in International Relations from Princeton. He is currently the Chairman of the Atlantic Council of the United States. General Goodpaster was the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, 1969-1974. He was the Director of Special Studies, Office of the Army Chief of Staff (1967), and was the Commandant of The National War College in 1968. General Goodpaster was the Deputy Commander of the U.S. Military Assistance Command in Vietnam 1968.
(page 22)
WILLIAM E. ODOM
Lieutenant General Odom is currently the Director of National Security Studies for the Hudson Institute and an adjunct professor at Yale University. From 1985 to 1988, General Odom was the Director of the National Security Agency and responsible for the agency's work in signals intelligence and communications security. From 1981 to 1985, General Odom served as Deputy Assistant and then Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence. During the Carter Administration, General Odom was a senior member of the National Security Council Staff and military assistant to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, Zbigniew Brzezinski (1977-1981). General Odom has written widely on Soviet political and military affairs.
BERNARD W. ROGERS
Born in Kansas, General Rogers graduated from West Point in 1943 and studied at Oxford as a Rhodes Scholar 1947-1950. He was the U.S. Army Chief of Staff (1976-1979) and the Supreme Allied Commander (1979 to 1987) during which time the United States deployed the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) in Western Europe as part of its dual track policy (in 1987, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. signed the INF Treaty). A battalion commander in the Korean War in 1952, General Rogers served as Assistant Division Commander, 1st Infantry Division in Vietnam 1966-1967, and as the Commanding General of the 5th Army Division 1969-1970. He is now a Consultant to the Coca-Cola Company, and General Dynamics Corporation, and a trustee of the Institute of Defense Analyses.
HARRY D. TRAIN II
Admiral Train graduated from the Naval Academy in 1949 and has over 30 years of Naval experience. He was the Commander of the 6th Fleet in 1976, and was assigned as Supreme Allied Commander, Ocean Sea Area, Atlantic in 1978. He was the Commanding Officer of the USS Conyngham (DDG-17) in 1967 and served on the staffs of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (1969-1971). He was assigned to the Office of the Secretary of Defense as Director of of the East Asia and Pacific Region (1973), and was the Director of Systems Analysis in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations 1973-1974. Admiral Train is presently an Executive Vice President with Strategic Research and Management Services.
(page 23)
BOB DOLE
KANSAS
United States Senate
OFFICE OF THE REPUBLICAN LEADER
WASHINGTON, DC 20510
MONDAY, JANUARY 29, 1990
BREAKFAST MEETING WITH MILITARY EXPERTS
9:00 A.M. - S-230
OUTSIDE PARTICIPANTS:
(handwritten check mark) General Andrew J. Goodpaster
Chairman
The Atlantic Council of the U.S.
(handwritten check mark) Admiral Harry D. Train
Strategic Research & Management Services
(handwritten check mark) General Russell E. Dougherty
McGuire Woods Battle & Boothe
General Edward C. Meyer
General Bernard W. Rogers
(handwritten check mark) Ambassador Bob Ellsworth
(handwritten) (check mark) General Odom (end handwritten)
SENATORS INVITED:
Dole - yes
(crossed out) Boren - will not be able to attend
Bryan - (crossed out) will call back
Domenici - yes (handwritten) 9:30 (end handwritten)
(crossed out) Heflin - will call back (handwritten) had to go Alabama 6:00 a.m. (end handwritten)
(crossed out) Inouye - will call back
(crossed out) Kasten - will call back
(crossed out) Lott - will call back
(crossed out) Lugar - yes
McClure - (crossed out) will call back
Nickles - (crossed out) yes
(crossed out) Shelby - will not be able to attend
(handwritten check mark) Wallop - yes
Warner - yes
Wilson - (crossed out) will call back
(handwritten) Reid
Robb (end handwritten)
(page 24)
BOB DOLE
KANSAS
United States Senate
OFFICE OF THE REPUBLICAN LEADER
WASHINGTON, DC 20510
MONDAY, JANUARY 29, 1990
BREAKFAST MEETING WITH MILITARY EXPERTS
9:00 A.M. - S-230
OUTSIDE PARTICIPANTS:
General Andrew J. Goodpaster
Chairman
The Atlantic Council of the U.S.
(handwritten check mark) Admiral Harry D. Train
Strategic Research & Management Services
General Russell E. Dougherty
McGuire Woods Battle & Boothe
General Edward C. Meyer
General Bernard W. Rogers
(handwritten check mark) Ambassador Bob Ellsworth
SENATORS INVITED:
Dole - yes
Boren - will not be able to attend
Bryan - will call back
Domenici - yes
Heflin - will call back
Inouye - will call back
(crossed out) Kasten - will call back
Lott - will call back
Lugar - yes
McClure - will call back
Nickles - yes
Shelby - will not be able to attend
Wallop - yes
Warner - yes
Wilson - will call back
(page 25)
BOB DOLE
KANSAS
United States Senate
OFFICE OF THE REPUBLICAN LEADER
WASHINGTON, DC 20510
MONDAY, JANUARY 29, 1990
BREAKFAST MEETING WITH MILITARY EXPERTS
9:00 A.M. - S-230
OUTSIDE PARTICIPANTS:
General Andrew J. Goodpaster
Chairman
The Atlantic Council of the U.S.
(handwritten check mark) Admiral Harry D. Train
Strategic Research & Management Services
General Russell E. Dougherty
McGuire Woods Battle & Boothe
General Edward C. Meyer
General Bernard W. Rogers
(handwritten check mark) Ambassador Bob Ellsworth
SENATORS INVITED:
Dole - yes
Boren - will not be able to attend
Bryan - will call back
Domenici - yes
Heflin - will call back
Inouye - will call back
(crossed out) Kasten will call back
Lott - will call back
Lugar - yes
McClure - will call back
Nickles - yes
Shelby - will not be able to attend
Wallop - yes
Warner - yes
Wilson - will call back
(page 26)
BOB DOLE
KANSAS
United States Senate
OFFICE OF THE REPUBLICAN LEADER
WASHINGTON, DC 20510
MONDAY, JANUARY 29, 1990
BREAKFAST MEETING WITH MILITARY EXPERTS
9:00 A.M. - S-230
OUTSIDE PARTICIPANTS:
General Andrew J. Goodpaster
Chairman
The Atlantic Council of the U.S.
(handwritten check mark) Admiral Harry D. Train
Strategic Research & Management Services
General Russell E. Dougherty
McGuire Woods Battle & Boothe
General Edward C. Meyer
General Bernard W. Rogers
(handwritten check mark) Ambassador Bob Ellsworth
SENATORS INVITED:
Dole - yes
Boren - will not be able to attend
Bryan - will call back
Domenici - yes
Heflin - will call back
Inouye - will call back
(crossed out) Kasten will call back
Lott - will call back
Lugar - yes
McClure - will call back
Nickles - yes
Shelby - will not be able to attend
Wallop - yes
Warner - yes
Wilson - will call back
(page 27)
(handwritten)
Mcclure
Rogers
Robb
Wilson
Train
Dougherty
Nickles
Bryan
(crossed out) Kasten
Stanley
(end handwritten)
(page 28)
(handwritten)
DOLE
ODOM
HEFLIN
ELLSWORTH
WARNER
WALLOP
DOMENICI
REID
GOODPASTER
BARATTA
(end handwritten)
(page 29)
(handwritten)
Place cards
Monday, January 29
Bkfst Mtg
(end handwritten)
(page 30)
(US Seal)
Senator Kasten
(page 31)
(handwritten) Joyce (end handwritten)
MEMORANDUM
JANUARY 25, 1989
TO: SENATOR DOLE
FROM: MIRA BARATTA
SUBJECT: BREAKFAST MEETING WITH MILITARY EXPERTS
Attached is the list of participants and their biographies, as well as talking points for Monday's breakfast meeting. It is my expectation that the discussion will probably focus on the question of the U.S. role in Europe, especially within the context of NATO. Related to that is the issue of U.S. troop levels and the role of tactical nuclear weapons and other nuclear systems in NATO strategy.
On the issue of troop levels, there is an increasing question of relevance of the Western proposal at the Conventional Forces in Europe talks (CFE), especially with regard to establishing a ceiling on U.S. and Soviet troop levels. Most of the Warsaw Pact nations want the Soviets out completely, so some fear this ceiling, may become a floor.
Once can argue convincingly that the Soviets view the CFE talks as a way to legitimize a substantial Soviet presence in Eastern Europe (Senator Wallop had an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal that made this point). The larger issue, though, is how to contend with this situation; Wallop wants us to leave the talks, but maybe we just need to change tactics and our proposal in some way.
With respect to the U.S. presence, most Allied governments view U.S. troops in Europe as a stabilizing factor. General Goodpaster made a big splash in the news last spring when he advocated that the Western proposal seek 50% cuts in U.S. and NATO forces and urged that NATO seriously look at unilateral reductions in forces should the Soviets change or reduce their forces.
With respect to the role of nuclear weapons in NATO strategy, as you know it is highly unlikely that the West Germans would agree to the modernization of short-range nuclear forces (SNF). And, in general West European public opinion would probably oppose such a move as a result of their perception that the threat from the Soviet Union has diminished considerably or disappeared. General Rogers did not support the INF Treaty because he believes that nuclear weapons should play a key role in NATO's strategy of "flexible response" (attached is an op-ed he wrote on this subject).
Another area that may be discussed is that of possible change in Soviet military doctrine. General Odom, former head of NSA, is also a Soviet expert. He may be able to discuss whether or not there is evidence of a change in Soviet strategy and military thinking. Finally, the issue of whether there is evidence of permanent changes in Soviet force structure is key to the U.S. evaluation of the "threat" (as you know, this should drive the dollars for our defense budget). Of course, we need to address new emerging threats such as chemical and ballistic missile proliferation.
(page 32)
TALKING POINTS FOR INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS
* THANK YOU FOR COMING HERE THIS MORNING TO DISCUSS THE CRITICAL ISSUE OF U.S. DEFENSE POLICY IN THE 1990s.
* WE ARE WITNESSING MANY DRAMATIC CHANGES IN EASTERN EUROPE AND AROUND THE GLOBE.
* WE ARE IN A PERIOD OF TRANSITION AND WE DON'T KNOW HOW LONG THAT TRANSITION WILL BE, NOR WHAT DANGERS THERE MIGHT BE.
* SO, THE QUESTION WE ARE FACED WITH IS: HOW DO WE RESPOND WITH RESPECT TO:
-- OUR DEFENSE BUDGET
-- OUR ALLIANCE RELATIONSHIPS
-- OUR ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS?
* WE ARE ALSO CONFRONTED WITH THE ISSUE OF WHETHER OR NOT THE CHANGES WE ARE SEEING ARE REVERSIBLE.
* IN MY VIEW, WHILE IT WOULD PROBABLY NOT BE FISCALLY WISE TO INCREASE OUR DEFENSE SPENDING, IT WOULD NOT BE MILITARILY WISE TO GUT THE STRONG DEFENSE WE BUILT IN THE 1980s.
* CLEARLY, THE THREAT OF A CONVENTIONAL WAR IN EUROPE IS DECREASING.
* WE NEED TO DEFINE OUR ROLE IN EUROPE, WITHIN NATO.
* HOWEVER, IN THE 1990s, THE UNITED STATES WILL ALSO FACE NEW THREATS, SUCH AS THE PROLIFERATION OF BALLISTIC MISSILES AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS, DRUG WARS AND TERRORISM.
* WE NEED TO PLAN FOR THOSE NEW CONTINGENCIES -- WITH NEW POLICIES, NEW TECHNOLOGIES, SUCH AS SDI, AND NEW TRAINING FOR OUR MILITARY.
* ON THE ARMS CONTROL FRONT, I BELIEVE WE SHOULD SEEK REDUCTIONS THROUGH VERIFIABLE TREATIES, RATHER THAN BY UNILATERAL ACTION.
-- ACHIEVING A CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT AT THE CFE TALKS IN VIENNA MAY BE A DIFFICULT TASK SINCE EVENTS IN EUROPE ARE MOVING SO QUICKLY -- WE HAVE TO ASK IF OUR POSITION IS STILL RELEVANT.
-- ON THE OTHER HAND, WHAT REMAINS RELATIVELY CONSTANT IS THE STRATEGIC BALANCE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION, SO IN MY VIEW, OUR START POSITION IS STILL ON TARGET.
* IN SUMMARY, THERE ARE MANY QUESTIONS AND FEW ANSWERS TO DATE. I HOPE THIS DISCUSSION WILL HELP US COME UP WITH SOME IDEAS, AND MAYBE SOME ANSWERS.
(page 33)
(handwritten)
New York Times
6-28-87
Sect. IV / pg. 25
(end handwritten)
(political cartoon of 5 subsequent images. On the farthest left is a missile launcher and the farthest right is a man holding a slingshot with the middle three being the transition and a man onlooking from a fence)
Why Compromise Our Deterrent Strength in Europe?
By Bernard W. Rogers
MONS, Belgium
Military strength and political will are both necessary for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to deter aggression, but the alliance has also long recognized the need for dialogue with the Soviet Union. (highlighted) A central element of NATO's approach is arms control.
NATO's strength, however, is threatened by a recent proposal in the talks on intermediate-range nuclear forces. The plan would eliminate the longer-range missiles in this category and reduce short-range weapons on each side. Such a move would harm the credibility of our deterrence, the ability to prevent aggression.
I have held that position for six years, since the plan was first put on the negotiating table. Arms control must not be an end in itself, and political leaders should guard against the natural tendency to seek short-term political success at the price of increasing military risk in the long run. (end highlighted)
Deterrence is in the mind of the beholder - the Soviet Union. The Russians must perceive that any aggression against the West will result in more pain than gain for them.
NATO decided to deploy (highlighted) land-based, long-range I.N.F. missiles in 1979 to fill a gap in our spectrum of deterrence. The gap existed because American F-111 aircraft based in Britain were then the last remaining part of the theater nuclear system that could reach Soviet soil, provided the aircraft could penetrate Warsaw Pact air defenses. The fact that the Russians began deploying SS-20 missile's in 1977 made the NATO decision more urgent.
Removing the land-based intermediate-range nuclear forces now would return NATO to its weak, pre-1979 posture. In fact, because the (end highlighted) Russians have continued to improve their conventional and nuclear forces, NATO would be in an even worse position now.
(highlighted) To establish credible deterrence. two capabilities, listed in NATO's guidelines for using nuclear weapons, are vital: the ability to strike, with certainty, targets deep in the Soviet homeland (only Pershing 2 missiles meet this requirement), and a number of nuclear escalatory options between conventional forces and the use of strategic nuclear forces.
The proposed I.N.F. agreement would eliminate the Pershing 2 missiles and thereby remove the first capability. It would also eliminate a crucial escalatory option. The result would be a reduction in the credibility of NATO's deterrence.(end highlighted)
Nonetheless, the I.N.F. proposal has been promoted by NATO political officials for the last six years, even though a number of them recognized, after the Reykjavik summit meeting. the folly of having done so.
How can allied governments now tell their people that they made a mistake, that they did not expect the Russians to agree to the reductions? Right or wrong, there will most likely be an agreement (assuming verification procedures are worked out) on eliminating long-range I.N.F. weapons. Political credibility - admittedly important - of governments, parties and national leaders will thus have assumed a higher priority than the credibility of our deterrence. What NATO must do now is to bolster that credibility.
A solution aimed toward that objective would include three points: linking the elimination of the remaining longer-range I.N.F. weapons to a satisfactory agreement on conventional and chemical weapons; reaching a lower and balanced level of shorter-range weapons by converting Pershing 2 missiles to shorter-range Pershing IB's; retaining the 72 Pershing IA's and their warheads in West Germany to balance the 600 Soviet Scud missiles aimed at Europe.
Although the elimination of our Pershing 2 missiles would prevent NATO from attacking Soviet targets quickly and with certainty, at least the Pershing IA's and IB's would let us strike targets located in western Poland, East Germany and Czechoslovakia.
Some people may assert that what I have suggested is infeasible. But if the Russians are as fearful of the Pershing 2's as it appears, and if they are prepared to pay the price to eliminate them, why should we pre-emptively concede that they won't accept such proposals? At least, let's try.
Throughout the arms control debate, I have been concerned by glib rationales presented by people who try to justify the so-called zero-zero plan, which would eliminate some intermediate-range and short-range weapons.
One rationale is, "Aren't the 4,600 warheads in Europe enough for adequate deterrence?" (This number was mandated at a NATO defense ministers meeting in 1983. Often overlooked is the fact that NATO has reduced its nuclear warheads from 7,000, unilaterally, since 1979.)
That is the wrong question. it should be. "Once the 572 long-range I.N.F. warheads are eliminated, what is the composition of the remaining warheads?" They consist of a few maritime depth charges (range 0). many artillery shells (9.5 miles), 95 Lance missiles (72 miles), 72 West German Pershing IA's (450 miles) and bombs for dual-capable aircraft, which can carry conventional and nuclear bombs.
Given the necessity to set artillery and the Lance missile systems well behind the forward edge of the battle in order to protect them from enemy fire, only the West German Pershing IA's can strike with certainty deep into non-Soviet Warsaw Pact territory. Our aircraft are limited in the range they can travel and by Warsaw Pact air defenses.
So it is more than just numbers of warheads involved. The real questions are: "Does NATO have the appropriate systems to hit targets we need to hold at risk, and do the Soviets know we can do it?"
Another rationale often heard is, "Since the Russians are giving up more warheads than NATO, this has to be a good deal for the West." Again, it is not numbers that matter. The Russians would lose only a very small fraction of their capability to strike Western Europe since every one of the thousands of Soviet warheads remaining, including intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, can still reach Western European soil.
(highlighted) On the other hand, the I.N.F. agreement would deny NATO the very weapon most feared by the Soviet Union - the Pershing 2 - and thus the most effective deterrent, thereby reducing the credibility of our overall deterrence and creating zones of unequal security in the alliance. (end highlighted)
A third rationale is, "NATO can use the submarine-launched ballistic missiles committed to the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe." While this is technically feasible, I believe it is politically infeasible today, as it was in 1977 to 1979, when NATO governments protested strongly against using "strategic" weapons for theater nuclear purposes. Moreover, although the Russians can discriminate between the launching of land-based ballistic missiles and the launching of submarine-based ballistic missiles, they cannot tell whether those being launched from submarines are part of the Supreme Allied Commander's limited inventory or from the American or British strategic nuclear inventory. Thus, they cannot know whether the West has begun an all-out nuclear attack.
Finally, a zero-zero accord would require NATO to bolster the credibility of its deterrence. The most critical step would be to improve conventional forces by exploiting our technological superiority - for example, with the so-called follow-on forces attack program.
Dual-capable aircraft must be protected from elimination no matter how enticing Mikhail S. Gorbachev's potential offer in this category may seem. We can protect them by hardening shelters, improving the aircraft defenses and their ability to penetrate Warsaw pact air defenses.
NATO must also modernize its nuclear capability. as NATO defense ministers recommended in 1983, long before an I.N.F. accord seemed possible. This means developing a new air-to-surface Standoff missile and a follow-on to the Lance missile, improved artillery fired atomic projectiles and completion of the Trident submarine programs.
(highlighted) A strong NATO is the West's best guarantee for a future of peace at the lowest possible level of risk. Arms control agreements that enhance our Security and maintain a credible deterrence can reduce risks. But agreements made solely to boost the political objectives of NATO officials will reduce NATO's capability to deter the Russians. NATO must not sacrifice long-term deterrence for short-term political expediency. (end highlighted)
The United States and its allies should evaluate very carefully, and honestly, the long-term consequences of arms proposals. No pact should be signed today that NATO countries will regret tomorrow - when current political leaders are no longer in power - leaving our people, especially in Western Europe, to live with the results.
(bottom left corner and high lighted) Bernard W. Rogers retired last week as Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, a position the general held for the last eight years. (end highlighted)
After the Waldheim Visit
By Jacqueline G. Wexler
For more than a quarter of a century. I have cherished the actions of Pope John XXIII and Vatican Council II for exorcising the devil of anti-Semitism from our great faith tradition.
In the ensuing years, great strides have been made to rid our liturgy and our theology of substantive and linguistic content that explicitly or implicitly fostered anti-Semitism.
It is precisely because of these decades of positive decisions and direction that Jews and many Roman Catholics are not only pained but also incredulous that Pope John Paul II chose to receive President Kurt Waldheim of Austria in an official state visit and seems not to have used the visit to exhort him toward public contrition for his Nazi affiliations.
Many church leaders and Catholic laymen had held some hope he would do so.
Many had also hoped that the Holy Father, as universal pastor, would have used the occasion to exhort Austrian Catholics to purge themselves of the substantive and symbolic anti-Semitism that has had a long and dark history in Austria. This seems not to have happened.
What do we do now?
I plead with my fellow Catholics to understand the deep anger and anguish of the Jewish people at what appears to be a retrogression to a laissez-faire posture of the official church in the era of the Holocaust.
1 plead with my Jewish brothers and sisters not to slam the doors of dialogue shut, whatever their frustrations and fears.
All human beings, including popes, make mistakes of judgment.
The pattern of actions.in Jewish-Catholic relations of John Paul II is far more positive than negative. Let us work together to reopen and deepen the dialogue.
Humility and courage are two sides of a single coin. The Pope and the hierarchy and Jewish leaders along with all Jews and Catholics will need both humility and courage.
(page 34)
OFFICE OF THE SENATE REPUBLICAN LEADER
PRESS SECRETARY
FACSIMILE COVER SHEET
TIME: (handwritten) 2:00 p.m. (end handwritten)
DATE: (handwritten) 1/23/90 (end handwritten)
TO: (handwritten) Jean - Senator Kasten's Office 47700 (end handwritten)
FROM: (handwritten) Joyce McCluney X42106 (end handwritten)
RE: (handwritten) Breakfast mtg on Mon. Jan. 29th
PAGES FOLLOW THIS COVER SHEET
DELIVERY:
(handwritten "X") URGENT - PLEASE HAND CARRY TO ADDRESSEE
IMMEDIATE - PLEASE DELIVER A.S.A.P.
COMMENTS:
SENT BY:
(OFFICE OF THE SENATE REPUBLICAN LEADER) (TELEPHONE: 202/224-5358 FACSIMILE: 202/224-3163)
(page 35)
BOB DOLE
KANSAS
United States Senate
OFFICE OF THE REPUBLICAN LEADER
WASHINGTON, DC 20510
OFFICE OF THE SENATE REPUBLICAN LEADER
FACSIMILE COVER SHEET
TIME:
DATE: (handwritten) 1/24 (end handwritten)
TO: (handwritten) Margaret - Senator (unintelligible) Office 47327 (end handwritten)
FROM: (handwritten) Joyce McCluney 42106
RE: (handwritten) Breakfast Mtg. (end handwritten)
(handwritten) 1 (end handwritten) PAGES FOLLOW THIS COVER SHEET
DELIVERY:
URGENT - PLEASE HAND CARRY TO ADDRESSEE
(handwritten X) IMMEDIATE - PLEASE DELIVER A.S.A.P.
COMMENTS:
SENT BY:
(OFFICE OF THE SENATE REPUBLICAN LEADER) (TELEPHONE: 202/224-3135 FACSIMILE: 202/224-3163)
(page 36)
BOB DOLE
KANSAS
United States Senate
OFFICE OF THE REPUBLICAN LEADER
WASHINGTON, DC 20510
OFFICE OF THE SENATE REPUBLICAN LEADER
FACSIMILE COVER SHEET
TIME: (handwritten) 3:00 pm (end handwritten)
DATE: (handwritten) 1/24/90 (end handwritten)
TO: (handwritten) Sheila - Senator Robb's Office 48689 (end handwritten)
FROM: (handwritten) Joyce McCluney - X 42106 (end handwritten)
RE: (handwritten) breakfast meeting on Mon., Jan 29th (end handwritten)
(handwritten) 1 (end handwritten) PAGES FOLLOW THIS COVER SHEET
DELIVERY:
URGENT - PLEASE HAND CARRY TO ADDRESSEE
IMMEDIATE - PLEASE DELIVER A.S.A.P.
COMMENTS:
SENT BY:
(OFFICE OF THE SENATE REPUBLICAN LEADER) (TELEPHONE: 202/224-3135 FACSIMILE: 202/224-3163)
(page 37)
BOB DOLE
KANSAS
United States Senate
OFFICE OF THE REPUBLICAN LEADER
WASHINGTON, DC 20510
MONDAY, JANUARY 29, 1990
BREAKFAST MEETING WITH MILITARY EXPERTS
9:00 A.M. - S-230
OUTSIDE PARTICIPANTS:
General Andrew J. Goodpaster
Chairman
The Atlantic Council of the U.S.
Admiral Harry D. Train
Strategic Research & Management Services
General Russell E. Dougherty
McGuire Woods Battle & Boothe
General Edward C. Meyer
General Bernard W. Rogers
Ambassador Bob Ellsworth
SENATORS INVITED:
Dole - yes
Boren - will not be able to attend
Bryan - will call back
Domenici - yes
Heflin - will call back
(handwritten) NO (end handwritten) Inouye - (crossed out) will call back
(handwritten) YES (end handwritten) Kasten - (crossed out) will call back
Lott - will call back
(handwritten) No (end handwritten) Lugar - (crossed out) yes
(handwritten) YES (end handwritten) McClure - (crossed out) will call back
Nickles - yes
Shelby - will not be able to attend
Wallop - yes
Warner - yes
(handwritten) Yes (end handwritten) Wilson - (crossed out) will call back
Reid - will call back
Robb - will call back
Dixon - will call back
(page 38)
MEMORANDUM
JANUARY 23, 1989
TO: SENATOR DOLE
FROM: MIRA BARATTA
SUBJECT: BREAKFAST MEETING ON MONDAY
The following Senators will be able to attend Monday's breakfast meeting with retired military: Lugar, Domenici, Wallop, Nickles, and Warner. We are making phone calls to the other Senators invited to check their responses. Senators Bryan, Heflin, Inouye, Wilson, Kasten, Lott, and McClure will be calling back today or tomorrow morning. Senators Boren and Shelby will not be able to attend.
Since we have positive responses only from Republicans than Democrats would you like us to check any other Democrats, perhaps the following?
Robb
Dixon
Bradley
Reid
Exon
(page 39)
OFFICE OF THE SENATE REPUBLICAN LEADER
PRESS SECRETARY
FACSIMILE COVER SHEET
TIME: (handwritten) 12 noon (end handwritten)
DATE: (handwritten) 1/23/90 (end handwritten)
TO: (handwritten) Susan Wells - Senator Lott's Office 42262 (end handwritten)
FROM: (handwritten) Joyce McCluney x 42106 (end handwritten)
RE: (handwritten) Breakfast Mtg on Mon., Jan 29th (end handwritten)
(handwritten) 1 (end handwritten) PAGES FOLLOW THIS COVER SHEET
DELIVERY:
(handwritten X) URGENT - PLEASE HAND CARRY TO ADDRESSEE
IMMEDIATE - PLEASE DELIVER A.S.A.P.
COMMENTS:
SENT BY:
(OFFICE OF THE SENATE REPUBLICAN LEADER) (TELEPHONE: 202/224-5358 FACSIMILE: 202/224-3163)
(page 40)
BOB DOLE
UNITED STATES SENATE
January 9, 1990
Dear General Goodpaster,
It is my pleasure to invite you to participate in an informal breakfast meeting with military experts, such as yourself, to discuss the critical issue of U.S. defense posture in the 1990s. This meeting will be held on January 29, 1990 at 9:00 in my Capitol office S-230.
In light of the dramatic changes around the globe and U.S. deficit pressures, deciding the direction of United States defense policy is one of the most pressing matters the Administration and the Congress will face this year. In my view, the United States needs to reach a consensus on defense priorities and strategy early in the budget process and I hope that this discussion will illuminate the choices we have as a nation.
I have invited General R. Dougherty, General E. Meyer, General B. Rogers, and Admiral H. Train to participate, as well as a small bipartisan group of senators. I hope that you will be able to attend. Please R.S.V.P. to Joyce McCluney at (202) 224-5311.
Sincerely,
(signature)
BOB DOLE
The United States Senate
General Andrew J. Goodpaster
Chairman
The Atlantic Council of the U.S.
1616 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
(handwritten) yes (end handwritten)
(page 41)
BOB DOLE
UNITED STATES SENATE
January 9, 1990
Dear General Meyer,
It is my pleasure to invite you to participate in an informal breakfast meeting with military experts, such as yourself, to discuss the critical issue of U.S. defense posture in the 1990s. This meeting will be held on January 29, 1990 at 9:00 in my Capitol office S-230.
In light of the dramatic changes around the globe and U.S. deficit pressures, deciding the direction of United States defense policy is one of the most pressing matters the Administration and the Congress will face this year. In my view, the United States needs to reach a consensus on defense priorities and strategy early in the budget process and I hope that this discussion will illuminate the choices we have as a nation.
I have invited General R. Dougherty, General A. Goodpaster, General B. Rogers, and Admiral H. Train to participate, as well as a small bipartisan group of senators. I hope that you will be able to attend. Please R.S.V.P. to Joyce McCluney at (202) 224-5311.
Sincerely,
(signature)
BOB DOLE
United States Senate
General Edward C. Meyer
1101 South Arlington Ridge Road
Apt. 1116
Arlington VA 22202
(handwritten) no (end handwritten)
(page 42)
BOB DOLE
UNITED STATES SENATE
January 9, 1990
Dear General Rogers,
It is my pleasure to invite you to participate in an informal breakfast meeting with military experts, such as yourself, to discuss the critical issue of U.S. defense posture in the 1990s. This meeting will be held on January 29, 1990 at 9:00 in my Capitol office S-230.
In light of the dramatic changes around the globe and U.S. deficit pressures, deciding the direction of United States defense policy is one of the most pressing matters the Administration and the Congress will face this year. In my view, the United States needs to reach a consensus on defense priorities and strategy early in the budget process and I hope that this discussion will illuminate the choices we have as a nation.
I have invited General R. Dougherty, General A. Goodpaster, General E. Meyer, and Admiral H. Train to participate, as well as a small bipartisan group of senators. I hope that you will be able to attend. Please R.S.V.P. to Joyce McCluney at (202) 224-5311.
Sincerely,
(signature)
BOB DOLE
United States Senate
General Bernard W. Rogers
1467 Hampton Ridge Drive
McLean, VA 22101
(handwritten) yes (end handwritten)
(page 43)
BOB DOLE
UNITED STATES SENATE
January 9, 1990
Dear Admiral Train,
It is my pleasure to invite you to participate in an informal breakfast meeting with military experts, such as yourself, to discuss the critical issue of U.S. defense posture in the 1990s. This meeting will be held on January 29, 1990 at 9:00 in my Capitol office S-230.
In light of the dramatic changes around the globe and U.S. deficit pressures, deciding the direction of United States defense policy is one of the most pressing matters the Administration and the Congress will face this year. In my view, the United States needs to reach a consensus on defense priorities and strategy early in the budget process and I hope that this discussion will illuminate the choices we have as a nation.
I have invited General R. Dougherty, General A. Goodpaster, General E. Meyer General B. Rogers, to participate, as well as a small bipartisan group of senators. I hope that you will be able to attend. Please R.S.V.P. to Joyce McCluney at (202) 224-5311.
Sincerely,
(signature)
BOB DOLE
United States Senate
Admiral Harry D. Train
Strategic Research and Management Services
100 West Plume
Suite 313
Norfolk, VA 23510
(handwritten) yes (end handwritten)
(page 44)
BOB DOLE
UNITED STATES SENATE
January 9, 1990
Dear Dave,
It is my pleasure to invite you to participate in an informal breakfast meeting with military experts, to discuss the critical issue of U.S. defense posture in the 1990s. This meeting will be held on January 29, 1990 at 9:00 in my Capitol office S-230.
In light of the dramatic changes around the globe and U.S. deficit pressures, deciding the direction of United States defense policy is one of the most pressing matters the Administration and the Congress will face this year. In my view, the United States needs to reach a consensus on defense priorities and strategy early in the budget process and I hope that this discussion will illuminate the choices we have as a nation.
I have invited General R. Dougherty, General A. Goodpaster, General E. Meyer General B. Rogers, and Admiral H. Train to participate, as well as a small bipartisan group of senators, such as yourself. I hope that you will be able to attend. Please R.S.V.P. to Joyce McCluney at (202) 224-5311.
Sincerely,
(signature)
BOB DOLE
United States Senate
The Honorable David L. Boren
United States Senate
Washington D.C. 20510
(handwritten) no (end handwritten)
(handwritten bottom left corner)
Bryan
Lott
Kasten
(end handwritten)
(page 45)
BOB DOLE
UNITED STATES SENATE
January 9, 1990
Dear Pete,
It is my pleasure to invite you to participate in an informal breakfast meeting with military experts, to discuss the critical issue of U.S. defense posture in the 1990s. his meeting will be held on January 29, 1990 t 9:00 in my Capitol office S-230.
In light of the dramatic changes around the globe and U.S. deficit pressures, deciding the direction of United States defense policy is one of the most pressing matters the Administration and the Congress will face this year. In my view, the United States needs to reach a consensus on defense priorities and strategy early in the budget process and I hope that this discussion will illuminate the choices we have as a nation.
I have invited General R. Dougherty, General A. Goodpaster, General E. Meyer General B. Rogers, and Admiral H. Train to participate, as well as a small bipartisan group of senators, such as yourself. I hope that you will be able to attend. Please R.S.V.P. to Joyce McCluney at (202) 224-5311.
Sincerely,
(signature)
BOB DOLE
United States Senate
The Honorable Pete V. Domenici
United States Senate
Washington D.C. 20510
(handwritten) yes (end handwritten)
(page 46)
BOB DOLE
UNITED STATES SENATE
January 9, 1990
Dear General Dougherty,
It is my pleasure to invite you to participate in an informal breakfast meeting with military experts, such as yourself, to discuss the critical issue of U.S. defense posture in the 1990s. This meeting will be held on January 29, 1990 at 9:00 in my Capitol office S-230.
In light of the dramatic changes around the globe and U.S. deficit pressures, deciding the direction of United States defense policy is one of the most pressing matters the Administration and the Congress will face this year. In my view, the United States needs to reach a consensus on defense priorities and strategy early in the budget process and I hope that this discussion will illuminate the choices we have as a nation.
I have invited General A. Goodpaster, General E. Meyer General B. Rogers, and Admiral H. Train to participate, as well as a small bipartisan group of senators. I hope that you will be able to attend. Please R.S.V.P. to Joyce McCluney at (202) 224-5311.
Sincerely,
(signature)
BOB DOLE
United States Senate
General Russell E. Dougherty
McGuire Woods Battle & Boothe
8280 Greensboro Drive
Suite 900
Tysons Corner, VA 22102
(handwritten) yes (end handwritten)
(page 47)
BOB DOLE
UNITED STATES SENATE
January 9, 1990
Dear Howell,
It is my pleasure to invite you to participate in an informal breakfast meeting with military experts, to discuss the critical issue of U.S. defense posture in the 1990s. This meeting will be held on January 29, 1990 at 9:00 in my Capitol office S-230.
In light of the dramatic changes around the globe and U.S. deficit pressures, deciding the direction of United States defense policy is one of the most pressing matters the Administration and the Congress will face this year. In my view, the United States needs to reach a consensus on defense priorities and strategy early in the budget process and I hope that this discussion will illuminate the choices we have as a nation.
I have invited General R. Dougherty, General A. Goodpaster, General E. Meyer General B. Rogers, and Admiral H. Train to participate, as well as a small bipartisan group of senators, such as yourself. I hope that you will be able to attend. Please R.S.V.P. to Joyce McCluney at (202) 224-5311.
Sincerely,
(signature)
BOB DOLE
United States Senate
The Honorable Howell Heflin
United States Senate
Washington D.C. 20510
(handwritten) wcb (end handwritten)
(page 48)
BOB DOLE
UNITED STATES SENATE
January 9, 1990
Dear Dan,
It is my pleasure to invite you to participate in an informal breakfast meeting with military experts, to discuss the critical issue of U.S. defense posture in the 1990s. This meeting will be held on January 29, 1990 at 9:00 in my Capitol office S-230.
In light of the dramatic changes around the globe and U.S. deficit pressures, deciding the direction of United States defense policy is one of the most pressing matters the Administration and the Congress will face this year. In my view, the United States needs to reach a consensus on defense priorities and strategy early in the budget process and I hope that this discussion will illuminate the choices we have as a nation.
I have invited General R. Dougherty, General A. Goodpaster, General E. Meyer General B. Rogers, and Admiral H. Train to participate, as well as a small bipartisan group of senators, such as yourself. I hope that you will be able to attend. Please R.S.V.P. to Joyce McCluney at (202) 224-5311.
Sincerely,
(signature)
BOB DOLE
United States Senate
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye
United States Senate
Washington D.C. 20510
(handwritten) wcb (end handwritten)
(page 49)
BOB DOLE
UNITED STATES SENATE
January 9, 1990
Dear Dick,
It is my pleasure to invite you to participate in an informal breakfast meeting with military experts, to discuss the critical issue of U.S. defense posture in the 1990s. This meeting will be held on January 29, 1990 at 9:00 in my Capitol office S-230.
In light of the dramatic changes around the globe and U.S. deficit pressures, deciding the direction of United States defense policy is one of the most pressing matters the Administration and the Congress will face this year. In my view, the United States needs to reach a consensus on defense priorities and strategy early in the budget process and I hope that this discussion will illuminate the choices we have as a nation.
I have invited General R. Dougherty, General A. Goodpaster, General E. Meyer General B. Rogers, and Admiral H. Train to participate, as well as a small bipartisan group of senators, such as yourself. I hope that you will be able to attend. Please R.S.V.P. to Joyce McCluney at (202) 224-5311.
Sincerely,
(signature)
BOB DOLE
United States Senate
The Honorable Richard G. Lugar
United States Senate
Washington D.C. 20510
(handwritten)
(crossed out) yes
no
going with Potus
(end handwritten)
(page 50)
BOB DOLE
UNITED STATES SENATE
January 9, 1990
Dear Jim,
It is my pleasure to invite you to participate in an informal breakfast meeting with military experts, to discuss the critical issue of U.S. defense posture in the 1990s. This meeting will be held on January 29, 1990 at 9:00 in my Capitol office S-230.
In light of the dramatic changes around the globe and U.S. deficit pressures, deciding the direction of United States defense policy is one of the most pressing matters the Administration and the Congress will face this year. In my view, the United States needs to reach a consensus on defense priorities and strategy early in the budget process and I hope that this discussion will illuminate the choices we have as a nation.
I have invited General R. Dougherty, General A. Goodpaster, General E. Meyer General B. Rogers, and Admiral H. Train to participate, as well as a small bipartisan group of senators, such as yourself. I hope that you will be able to attend. Please R.S.V.P. to Joyce McCluney at (202) 224-5311.
Sincerely,
(signature)
BOB DOLE
United States Senate
The Honorable James A. McClure
United States Senate
Washington D.C. 20510
(page 51)
BOB DOLE
UNITED STATES SENATE
January 9, 1990
Dear Don,
It is my pleasure to invite you to participate in an informal breakfast meeting with military experts, to discuss the critical issue of U.S. defense posture in the 1990s. This meeting will be held on January 29, 1990 at 9:00 in my Capitol office S-230.
In light of the dramatic changes around the globe and U.S. deficit pressures, deciding the direction of United States defense policy is one of the most pressing matters the Administration and the Congress will face this year. In my view, the United States needs to reach a consensus on defense priorities and strategy early in the budget process and I hope that this discussion will illuminate the choices we have as a nation.
I have invited General R. Dougherty, General A. Goodpaster, General E. Meyer General B. Rogers, and Admiral H. Train to participate, as well as a small bipartisan group of senators, such as yourself. I hope that you will be able to attend. Please R.S.V.P. to Joyce McCluney at (202) 224-5311.
Sincerely,
(signature)
BOB DOLE
United States Senate
The Honorable Don Nickles
United States Senate
Washington D.C. 20510
(handwritten) yes (end handwritten)
(page 52)
BOB DOLE
UNITED STATES SENATE
January 9, 1990
Dear Richard.
It is my pleasure to invite you to participate in an informal breakfast meeting with military experts, to discuss the critical issue of U.S. defense posture in the 1990s. This meeting will be held on January 29, 1990 at 9:00 in my Capitol office S-230.
In light of the dramatic changes around the globe and U.S. deficit pressures, deciding the direction of United States defense policy is one of the most pressing matters the Administration and the Congress will face this year. In my view, the United States needs to reach a consensus on defense priorities and strategy early in the budget process and I hope that this discussion will illuminate the choices we have as a nation.
I have invited General R. Dougherty, General A. Goodpaster, General E. Meyer General B. Rogers, and Admiral H. Train to participate, as well as a small bipartisan group of senators, such as yourself. I hope that you will be able to attend. Please R.S.V. P. to Joyce McCluney at (202) 224-5311.
Sincerely,
(signature)
BOB DOLE
United States Senate
The Honorable Richard C. Shelby
United States Senate
Washington D.C. 20510
(handwritten) no (end handwritten)
(page 53)
BOB DOLE
UNITED STATES SENATE
January 9, 1990
Dear Malcolm,
It is my pleasure to invite you to participate in an informal breakfast meeting with military experts, to discuss the critical issue of U.S. defense posture in the 1990s. This meeting will be held on January 29, 1990 at 9:00 in my Capitol office S-230.
In light of the dramatic changes around the globe and U.S. deficit pressures, deciding the direction of United States defense policy is one of the most pressing matters the Administration and the Congress will face this year. In my view, the United States needs to reach a consensus on defense priorities and strategy early in the budget process and I hope that this discussion will illuminate the choices we have as a nation.
I have invited General R. Dougherty, General A. Goodpaster, General E. Meyer General B. Rogers, and Admiral H. Train to participate, as well as a small bipartisan group of senators, such as yourself. I hope that you will be able to attend. Please R.S.V.P. to Joyce McCluney at (202) 224-5311.
Sincerely,
(signature)
BOB DOLE
United States Senate
The Honorable Malcolm Wallop
United States Senate
Washington D.C. 20510
(handwritten) yes (end handwritten)
BOB DOLE
UNITED STATES SENATE
January 9, 1990
Dear John,
It is my pleasure to invite you to participate in an informal breakfast meeting with military experts, to discuss the critical issue of U.S. defense posture in the 1990s. This meeting will be held on January 29, 1990 at 9:00 in my Capitol office S-230.
In light of the dramatic changes around the globe and U.S. deficit pressures, deciding the direction of United States defense policy is one of the most pressing matters the Administration and the Congress will face this year. In my view, the United States needs to reach a consensus on defense priorities and strategy early in the budget process and I hope that this discussion will illuminate the choices we have as a nation.
I have invited General R. Dougherty, General A. Goodpaster, General E. Meyer General B. Rogers, and Admiral H. Train to participate, as well as a small bipartisan group of senators, such as yourself. I hope that you will be able to attend. Please R.S.V.P. to Joyce McCluney at (202) 224-5311.
Sincerely,
(signature)
BOB DOLE
United States Senate
The Honorable John W. Warner
United States Senate
Washington D.C. 20510
(handwritten) yes (end handwritten)
(page 55)
BOB DOLE
UNITED STATES SENATE
January 9, 1990
Dear Pete,
It is my pleasure to invite you to participate in an informal breakfast meeting with military experts, to discuss the critical issue of U.S. defense posture in the 1990s. This meeting will be held on January 29, 1990 at 9:00 in my Capitol office S-230.
In light of the dramatic changes around the globe and U.S. deficit pressures, deciding the direction of United States defense policy is one of the most pressing matters the Administration and the Congress will face this year. In my view, the United States needs to reach a consensus on defense priorities and strategy early in the budget process and I hope that this discussion will illuminate the choices we have as a nation.
I have invited General R. Dougherty, General A. Goodpaster, General E. Meyer General B. Rogers, and Admiral H. Train to participate, as well as a small bipartisan group of senators, such as yourself. I hope that you will be able to attend. Please R.S.V.P. to Joyce McCluney at (202) 224-5311.
Sincerely,
(signature)
BOB DOLE
United States Senate
The Honorable Pete Wilson
United States Senate
Washington D.C. 20510
(page 56)
MEMORANDUM
JANUARY 23, 1989
TO: SENATOR DOLE
FROM: MIRA BARATTA
SUBJECT: BREAKFAST MEETING ON MONDAY
The following Senators will be able to attend Monday's breakfast meeting with retired military: (crossed out "Lugar"), Domenici, Wallop, Nickles, and Warner. We are making phone calls to the other Senators invited to check their responses. Senators Bryan, (crossed out "Heflin, Inouye, Wilson, Kasten, Lott"), and (arrow pointing to "McClure with "yes" written) McClure will be calling back today or tomorrow morning. Senators Boren and Shelby will not be able to attend.
Since we have positive responses only from Republicans than Democrats would you like us to check any other Democrats, perhaps the following?
(handwritten check mark) Robb (handwritten) Sheila yes (end handwritten)
(hadnwritten check mark) Dixon (handwritten) - Beta No - out of town (end handwritten)
Bradley
(handwritten check mark) Reid (handwritten) will call back (end handwritten)
Exon
(handwritten)
McClure - yes
Wilson - yes
Kasten - yes
Inouye no
OK Harry Reid - (43542) FAX-47327
margaret attn:
Lott no
(end handwritten)
(page 57)
(far left column) YEAS (far right column) NAYS
(middle column)
Armstrong
Bond
Boschwitz
(highlighted) Burns (end highlighted) (handwritten) H Leighty (end handwritten)
(highlighted) Chafee (end highlighted) (handwritten) WSCB (end handwritten)
Coats
Cochran
Cohen
D'Amato
Danforth
Dole
(highlighted) Domenici (end highlighted) (unintelligible handwritten name)
Durenberger
(highlighted) Garn (end highlighted) (handwritten) Parker (end handwritten)
Gorton
Gramm
Grassley
Hatch
Hatfield
Heinz
(highlighted) Helms (end highlighted) (handwritten) A. Reid (end handwritten)
Humphrey
(highlighted) Jeffords (end highlighted) (handwritten) H. Hoffman (end handwritten)
Kassebaum
Kasten
Lott
Lugar
Mack
McCain
McClure
McConnell
Murkowski
Nickles
Packwood
Pressler
Roth
Rudman
(highlighted) Simpson (end highlighted) (handwritten) EC Shaw (end handwritten)
Specter
Stevens
Symms
Thurmond
Wallop
Warner
Wilson
(handwritten and high lighted) VP (end highlighted) (right column) LEM (end handwritten)
(Printed by the Secretary for the Minority)
GPO: 1990 25-776 (m)
(page 58)
(far left column) YEAS (far right column) NAYS
(middle column)
Armstrong
(highlighted) Bond (end highlighted) (unintelligible handwritten name)
Boschwitz
Burns
Chafee
(highlighted) Coats (end highlighted) (handwritten) Jr. Flood (end handwritten)
(highlighted) Cochran (end highlighted) (handwritten) K. Webber (end handwritten)
Cohen
D'Amato
(highlighted) Danforth (end highlighted) (handwritten) M. Mants (end handwritten)
Dole
Domenici
(highlighted) Durenberger (end highlighted) (handwritten in right column) DRW (end handwritten)
Garn
Gorton
(highlighted) Gramm (end highlighted)
Grassley
(highlighted) Hatch (end highlighted) (handwritten in right column) RB (end handwritten)
Hatfield
(highlighted) Heinz (end highlighted) (handwritten in right column) CS (end handwritten)
Helms
Humphrey
Jeffords
(highlighted) Kassebaum (end highlighted) (handwritten) E Johnston (end handwritten)
Kasten
(highlighted) Lott (end highlighted) (handwritten) L A Kirk (end handwritten)
Lugar
Mack
(highlighted) McCain (end highlighted) (handwritten) MMM- (end handwritten)
McClure
(highlighted) McConnell (end highlighted) (handwritten) Dawn Riley (end handwritten)
Murkowski
Nickles
(highlighted) Packwood (end highlighted) (handwritten) S. Lucas (end handwritten)
Pressler
Roth
Rudman
Simpson
Specter
Stevens
Symms
(highlighted) Thurmond (end highlighted) (handwritten) S. (unintelligible) (end handwritten)
(highlighted) Wallop (end highlighted) (handwritten) Sully (unintelligible) (end handwritten)
(highlighted) Warner (end highlighted) (handwritten) B Del Monte (end handwritten)
Wilson
(Printed by the Secretary for the Minority)
GPO: 1990 25-776 (m)
Not viewed