Viet-Nam Information Notes State Department Newsletter, Number 15

Item

Other Media

s-leg_630_010_001_tr.txt

Extent (Dublin Core)

2 Pages

File Name (Dublin Core)

s-leg_630_010_001

Title (Dublin Core)

Viet-Nam Information Notes State Department Newsletter, Number 15

Date (Dublin Core)

1969-11

Date Created (Dublin Core)

1969-11

Congress (Dublin Core)

91st (1969-1971)

Topics (Dublin Core)

See all items with this valueDiplomatic negotiations in international disputes

See all items with this valueVietnam War, 1961-1975

Policy Area (Curation)

Armed Forces and National Security

International Affairs

Creator (Dublin Core)

United States. Department of State. Office of Media Services.

Record Type (Dublin Core)

newsletters

Names (Dublin Core)

See all items with this valueNixon, Richard M. (Richard Milhous), 1913-1994

Rights (Dublin Core)

http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/CNE/1.0/

Language (Dublin Core)

eng

Collection Finding Aid (Dublin Core)

https://dolearchivecollections.ku.edu/index.php?p=collections/controlcard&id=23&q=

Physical Location (Dublin Core)

Collection 003, Box 630, Folder 10

Institution (Dublin Core)

Robert J. Dole Institute of Politics, University of Kansas, Lawrence, KS

Archival Collection (Dublin Core)

Robert J. Dole Senate Papers-Legislative Relations, 1969-1996

Full Text (Extract Text)

This document is from the collections at the Dole Archives, University of Kansas
http://dolearchives.ku.edu
handwritten at top of page: B-2

VIET-NAM INFORMATION NOTES
OFFICE OF MEDIA SERVICES, BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
NUMBER 15, NOVEMBER 1969

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

THE PARIS PEACE TALKS
"We should be confident that an honorable peace is possible if we here at home remain steady.' -President Nixon

INTRODUCTION
The search for peace in Viet-Nam and Southeast Asia is a matter of the highest priority to the United States. No other question so engages the time and attention of the President and his principal advisers.

The U.S. delegation to the Paris Peace Talks on Viet-Nam has used the weekly meetings since January 1969 to lay out an extensive program for peace. This program provides for a mutual withdrawal of all non-South Viet-namese forces, supervised cease-fires, free elections under international supervision, and the early release of prisoners of war on both sides. The United States endorses the proposals of President Nguyen Van Thieu of the Republic of Viet-Nam for the conduct of free elections in which all political parties and groups can participate. Both we and the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam have stated we will abide by the results of those elections.

Our objective at Paris is meaningful negotiation and compromise, leading to a resolution of the crucial issues which divide us, and not rigid insistence upon one's own individual position. While the other side's 10-point proposal contains certain unacceptable provisions, some points appear negotiable, and our delegation has tried to examine these at the Paris sessions to find common ground between our respective positions. Neither the U.S. Government nor the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam poses any precondition for such discussions. But the other side has never tried to find in our proposals common elements on which we might agree or which we might even further examine. On the contrary, the other side always flatly rejects them.

The United States has taken a number of important steps to reduce the level of violence, beginning with the partial cessation of bombing in North Viet-Nam in March 1968 and the total cessation of all acts of force against North Viet-Nam in November 1968. Our air operations in South Viet-Nam have been reduced by over 20 percent. The emphasis has been shifted from maximum military pressure on the enemy to holding U.S. combat losses to a minimum while undertaking operations consistent with our mission to protect allied forces and the civilian population. We have begun to reduce our presence in South Viet-Nam by setting in motion the replacement of over 60,000 U.S. troops. On September 16, 1969, President Nixon ordered a reduction of the troop ceiling in Viet-Nam to 484,000 by December 15, 1969.

To date, all U.S. efforts to get serious negotiations underway at Paris have failed for two reasons:
(1) the other side's insistence that its proposals can be the only basis for discussion; and
(2) its adamant refusal to negotiate with the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam on any basis whatsoever.

In spite of this, the United States and its allies continue to press for meaningful discussions at Paris. We have made it very plain that we consider all the points at issue negotiable except the basic right of the South Vietnamese to determine their own future.

HISTORY OF THE PARIS TALKS
The Paris talks represent the culmination of a long process of diplomatic negotiation and maneuver.* Since 1965 the United States has sought peace in conferences with hundreds of world figures, undertaken many public initiatives for peace, and participated in hundreds of high-level private talks with friends and adversaries throughout the world. North Viet-Nam rejected all these proposals until President Johnson announced on March 31, 1968, a unilateral reduction of the level of hostilities - an end to the bombing of 78 percent of the territory of Viet-Nam, restricting it to the area north of the demilitarized zone (DMZ) where the enemy buildup threatened allied forward positions. At the same time, the President proposed bilateral talks with the North Vietnamese to bring the war to an end.

*See Viet-Nam Information Notes, No. 2, "The Search for Peace" (Dept. of State pub. 8196).

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This document is from the collections at the Dole Archives, University of Kansas
http://dolearchives.ku.edu

On April 3, 1968, North Viet-Nam indicated its readiness to establish preliminary contact with U.S. representatives to arrange for an "unconditional" end to American military operations against the North. After exchanging numerous proposals of possible sites for the talks, the two sides agreed to meet at Paris. On May 10 the representatives of North Viet-Nam, headed by former Foreign Minister Xuan Thuy, and the representatives of the United States, headed by Ambassador Averell Harriman, met for the first time in the International Conference Center at the Majestic Hotel, Paris.

During the bilateral talks the North Vietnamese negotiators pressed for an unconditional end to the bombing of North Viet-Nam. U.S. representatives offered a complete bombing halt if the other side would agree to reduce its war effort. On November 1 President Johnson ordered a halt to all bombing of the North, with the understanding that North Viet-Nam would not abuse the DMZ or carry out indiscriminate attacks against the major cities of South Viet-Nam. At the same time it was agreed that a new series of expanded meetings to discuss a peace settlement would follow, with the participation of representatives of the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam and the so-called "National Liberation Front."

The first substantive meeting of the expanded talks was held on January 25, 1969, at the Majestic Hotel. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge replaced Ambassador Harriman as chief of the U.S. delegation. He was joined by Pham Dang Lam of the Republic of Viet-Nam. On the Communist side, Xuan Thuy was joined by Tran Buu Kiem of the Viet Cong's National Liberation Front (NLF). Kiem was replaced in June by Madame Nguyen Thi Binh, the "Foreign Minister" of the so-called "Provisional Revolutionary Government" of the Viet Cong. Plenary sessions have been held nearly every week since that time.

PROPOSALS OF U.S. AND SOUTH VIET-NAM
The United States and the Republic of Viet-Nam have presented a comprehensive program for peace at Paris, based on proposals announced by President Nixon on May 14 and by South Vietnamese President Thieu on July 11. Those proposals include provision for:

· Phased, mutual withdrawals of all non-South Vietnamese forces - North Vietnamese, United States, and allied. The withdrawal would be carried out on a specified timetable and verified by an international supervisory body acceptable to both sides. We have proposed the complete withdrawal of all outside forces within one year. We have said we would settle for a de facto removal of North Vietnamese forces so long as there are reliable assurances that they will not return.

· A supervised cease-fire arranged with the participation of an international supervisory body.

· Internationally supervised elections, with provision for an electoral commission including representatives of the NLF to assure equal opportunity for all candidates to campaign and to enable all parties to join in watching the polls and counting the ballots. The United States and South Viet-Nam have pledged themselves to abide by the result of these elections, whatever this might be, and have challenged the other side to do likewise.

· Political amnesty for all those who renounce the use of force, with no reprisals.

· Release of prisoners of war at the earliest possible time.

· Observance by all parties of the basic elements of the Geneva accords of 1954 regarding South Viet-Nam and Cambodia, and the Laos accords of 1962.

The United States has repeatedly emphasized that it does not oppose the reunification of Viet-Nam, provided that this is freely decided upon by the people of South and North Viet-Nam.

The United States has said that we do not seek a military victory in Viet-Nam. We have stated repeatedly that we want no permanent military base in South Viet-Nam, and insist on no military alliance with that country.

U.S. ACTIONS
The United States has carried out its part of the understanding which preceded the expanded peace talks at Paris. There has been no bombing of North Viet-Nam since November 1, 1968.

We have also taken other actions to reduce the level of violence. Our air operations against Communist forces in South Viet-Nam have been reduced. We have emphasized to our military commanders that losses be held to a minimum consistent with their basic mission to protect allied forces and the civilian population.

We have reduced the number of our troops in South Viet-Nam. By December 15, 1969, we will have withdrawn 60,000 men. The fact that most of the troops being withdrawn are combat soldiers, not support personnel, underscores our desire to reduce the violence.

President Nixon, in a speech September 18 to the U.N. General Assembly at New York, appealed to all members of the United Nations to persuade Hanoi to begin serious negotiation. He noted that "the steps we have taken have

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