This document is from the collections at the Dole Archives, University of Kansas http://dolearchives.ku.edu

NATIONAL LEAGUE OF FAMILIES OF AMERICAN PRISONERS AND MISSING IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 1608 K STREET, N.W., WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006 (202) 223-6846

REMARKS OF EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR ANN MILLS GRIFFITHS 15TH ANNUAL MEETING

July 19, 1984

First, the League's role in the POW/MIA issue has increased at a tremendous rate. From starting as a small, family group, often considered a band of emotional individuals who couldn't face reality, we have grown into a comprehensive organization which is instrumental in the strategy to account for our men.

The League's objectives are still the same -- the return of all prisoners, the fullest possible accounting for those still missing and the repatriation of remains of those who died. Greatest emphasis is and must continue to be placed on the live POW issue.

The board of directors and you, the members, establish League policy. The staff, including those in the national and special projects offices, implement that policy. In my position as executive director, I have direct responsibility to provide the board with the best possible input, assessment and advice based on daily, continuous contact with all aspects connected with resolving the issue.

The League's instrumental role brings with it tremendous responsibilities, not the least of which is ensuring that decisions on approach and direction are always based on what moves the issue forward, what is best for our own men.

It is not only the Defense Intelligence Agency, State and Defense Departments and the White House which look to the League as a central focal point on the issue, it is the media, veterans organizations, other private POW/MIA groups, agencies of the U.S. government which have a less direct role in actual resolution of the problem, and perhaps most importantly, and on an ever increasing basis, the Vietnamese and the Lao governments.

The Lao and Vietnamese clearly understand that the League is not in a position to fulfill needs or resolve political issues between their governments and ours; however, they view the League, the families as those most directly affected and influential. They are aware that current U.S. government emphasis and priority on resolving this issue has been brought about by years of constant pressure, determination that our own government must fulfill its moral and legal responsibilities to our men and to us.

We, the League, are in the best possible position to generate public awareness necessary to bring the results we seek. Not long ago, the board reaffirmed League priority on public awarneess efforts. This decision reflected realization of the best role the League can play.

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This document is from the collections at the Dole Archives, University of Kansas http://dolearchives.ku.edu

Our efforts began to have much greater impact on the public when the U.S. government adopted public awareness as part of the strategy to resolve the issue. Positions long held by the League were no longer falling on deaf ears - those of the government or the American people. The League's credibility improved in direct proportion to the high level, official statements attesting to validity of the POW/MIA issue. Such statements, by the President, Secretary of Defense and others, are not just rhetoric - they give credibility and validity to the issue and to the League.

Recent reactions to increased public interest bring a clear message. Our efforts are producing results - not the final results we all seek but measurable progress. The latest is the long-promised return of remains on July 17th and the agreement, just announced, to resume technical meetings in mid-August.

No! we don't yet have a POW returned ..... Yes, the pace is too slow, much too slow for us and you've heard the government publicly state the same. But I'd like to list just a few of the "results" accomplished by gaining the status of "highest national priority" for the POW/MIA issue.

For years, the League urged, pleaded and begged the U.S. government to develop some strategy for resolving the issue, some process which could reasonably obtain positive responses from the Vietnamese and Lao governments. We finally have such a strategy - and it is beginning to show some success. The key is to ensure that the Vietnamese and Lao understand it is in their own interest to cooperate with the United States on this issue. Public awareness aids that understanding. They have stated willingness to cooperate based on the increased interest of the American people.

For years the League badgered, passed resolutions and testified in Congress that the U.S. government should undertake high level negotiations on the POW issue such high level statements. Most importantly, we have gained the ability to directly influence efforts to achieve our goals. We also have gained a sufficiently sound financial base to alleviate the burden on you, the families, and a few veterans who kept the League from closing during those difficult years.

I'm often asked how long do we have to wait? How much longer are we expected to be patient? I wish I could answer those questions, not only for you but for me. Never think that my level of frustration is any less than yours. It is not! I live with this problem as much or more than anyone here, looking for every possible way to make progress. I have not yet found a viable alternative to the positive direction undertaken by this administration.

No amount of effort is or ever will be adequate until we return our men - alive or dead. There is constant evaluation of direction and approach by the U.S. government - I know, I take part in that process through the Interagency Group (IAG) .

When applying for the position of exeuctive director for the coming year, I and the others individually interviewed, was requested to write a paper on "Solutions to the POW/MIA Issue." To conclude my remarks, I would like to share my thoughts on that important subject.

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This document is from the collections at the Dole Archives, University of Kansas http://dolearchives.ku.edu

"The U.S. government (USG) bears the legal and moral responsibility to pursue the fullest possible accounting for the missing in Southeast Asia. In addition, they possess the tools (diplomatic assets, the military, intelligence and financial resources along with U.S. prestige) that offer the greatest hope for resolution.

The Indochinese governments possess the answers sought by us, are motivated by their own national interest, and choose the time and circumstances on when to cooperate.

The greatest chance for success is to help maximize the tools the USG possesses to influence Indochina to cooperate on the one hand while ensuring that U.S. intelligence is continuously active in the interim to confirm any locations of live prisoners which military or other means can use decisively to extract our men.

The League is uniquely placed to monitor this entire process, on a general basis by the board and a specific basis by the executive director. This allows timely, serious and professional input and advice. It serves to alert us if our objectives are being given shortshrift. It provides the ability to help the President ensure this administration is implementing his pledge of highest national priority.

Because of the announced partnership between the League and the USG, we are now the private sector focal point for the USG, the Congress, the veterans groups, other POW/MIA groups, foreign governments and concerned citizens. It is a powerful position but also one of great responsibility. The League needs to maximize this position through unity, professionalism and sound advice to those who come to us. At this point in time, we should attempt to educate those who support our objectives but pursue actions counterproductive to them. Should this not work, we should have sufficient moral courage to publicly denounce their actions.

The League has gone through many transitions. Demonstrations and denunciation of the government, from the President on down, have been necessary in the past. (I helped lead that effort.) As the League passes through these phases, we must always put the issue first and ensure that all of our energies are focused on making the most of our greatest hope for success at that particular point in time.

Simultaneously, the League should be prepared with the same moral courage, to break the cooperative relationship with the USG if they break their word to us by not pursuing the issue with the pledged highest national priority. However, in doing so, we must have the force of evidence and credibility or it would be a fruitless, selfdestructive act that places us in the position of any other lobby group.

With current government priority, we should encourage private operators who generate intelligence to put it in the hands of the professionals so it can be correlated with officially gathered intelligence. Should this priority change, the League should be prepared to seek other avenues that have a chance of success, most of which would be foreign based.

Contingent on current government priority, potential sources of intelligence, resources, etc, that come to our attention should be checked with the USG for bona fides. They possess incredible amounts of data on resistance

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This document is from the collections at the Dole Archives, University of Kansas http://dolearchives.ku.edu

leaders, strengths, areas of operation and influence. In addition, they have contacts. This data bank of experience, built over many years, is crucial to evaluation. Only the U.S. governemnt has the capability to correlate systematically and accurately any potential proff, such as fingerprints, etc.

The League needs to be the focal point for national public awareness. The message of public awareness must be responsible, not outlandish assertions that destroy our credibility in the eyes of influential members of the government and private sectors as well as foreign government officials who can and are willing to help us. In the current environment, public awareness can be most effective by uniting the country behind the President's pledge and directing this pressure towards Hanoi. The Vietnamese have officially said they believe the USG is pressing the POW/MIA issue for political reasons, not aware or believing that the USG is pursuing this because of the President's longheld interest.

The Vietnamese perception is right for the diplomatic effort, but only as long as they don't perceive it can be exploited against the President. Such circumstances would cause them to again link cooperation to other issues, thus delaying resolution.

Public awareness focus on the League is a powerful tool should the USG drop the priority, we should be willing to use that tool, which the USG helped build with us, to pressur them again. Even without this focus, the White House, DOD, and State Department receive hundreds of letters on the POW/MIA issue. Many come from people who receive our direct mail. USG responses are very supporative of the League, because we have credibility. Should the priority drop and the League be forced back into opposition to our own government, we still need to maintain credibility by being factual and determined, rather than endorsing unsubstantiated and wild, hysterical claims.

The League needs to continue its liaison with private, humanitarian groups, international businessmen, ASEAN government officials and officials of the Lao and Vietnamese governments. These contacts need to be continued to further our overall objective by ensuring that there is a steady message flow into Hanoi and other capitals that it is in Indochinese interest to cooperate with the USG and that public opinion can turn ugly for them if they do not.

We need to maitain our liaison with responsible news media and not "sell our story" to any "rag" that comes off the street. National media attention, combined with coverage from locally recognized newspapers, gains greater attention and credibility for the issue and the League than a million irresponsible pamphlets, flyers, fly-by-night newspapers and self-published books.

We need to maintain our close liaison with the POW/MIA Task Force in Congress and pressure the other members, through their constituents, to support our objectives. The Congressional role in this issue will become increasingly important, especially on the incentive side when needed in negotiatons. The Executive Branch runs into incredible opposition from certain Congressional elements on the Lao initiative. The League needs to help promote support for such programs through intensive contact by our membership, vets groups and concerned citizens.

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This document is from the collections at the Dole Archives, University of Kansas http://dolearchives.ku.edu

In summary, we need to maintain ourselves as the credible and responsible private focal point for the nation on this issue and, from that position, mobilize public opinion to: reinforce current diplomatic efforts; gain and maintain confidence through responsible efforts with the Congress, foreign governments, the USG, veterans groups, other POW/MIA organizations and concerned citizens; closely monitor USG efforts and provide direct input while policy is being made; funnel intelligence to supplement official efforts; and maintain our outward unity on the issue to the nation and the Indochinese governments.

Finally, should this administration drop their priority or a new administration may not adopt it as highest national priority, the League should go into opposition using the credibility we have gained through responsible activity. Should the need arise, I am prepared to carry out such a role with as much fervor and dedication as I now am with the current strategy."

Thank you.

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