This document is from the collections at the Dole Archives, University of Kansas http://dolearchives.ku.edu Report Concerning Misinformation On The Issue Of American Prisoners of War And Missing In Action In Southeast Asia National League Of Families Of American Prisoners And Missing In Southeast Asia 1608 K Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20006 S-leg_183_003_002_A1b.pdf Page 1 of 8 This document is from the collections at the Dole Archives, University of Kansas http://dolearchives.ku.edu TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 1-4 CONSPIRACY & COVERUP 4-6 POLITICAL MOTIVATION 7-10 DISINFORMATION: THE HANOI CONNECTION 10-11 UNFOUNDED ALLEGATIONS/ASSERTIONS/DISTORTIONS OF FACT 11-17 Information Withheld National Forget-Me-Not Association Task Force Omega Project Prairie Fire Sky Hook II Veterans Vigil of Honor MEDIA DISTORTION 17-20 MEDIA EXPLOITATION 20-23 MISINFORMATION IN PUBLIC APPEALS: OPERATION RESCUE 23-26 CASE STUDY ON MISINFORMATION: "THE INSIDERS" 26-37 CONCLUSION 37-39 s-leg_183_003_002_A1b.pdf Page 2 of 8 This document is from the collections at the Dole Archives, University of Kansas http://dolearchives.ku.edu INTRODUCTION "Facts do not cease to exist because they are ignored." (Aldous Huxley) Definition of misinformation: Standard College Dictionary, "false or erroneous information." Oxford Universal Dictionary, "the act of misinforming." Distribution of misinformation is a serious and growing detriment to the POW/MIA issue. Distortions of fact, misinformation, unfounded allegations and vindictive statements against the League, other responsible veterans and POW/MIA groups, and the United States Government are damaging, prolong resolution of the issue and cause divisiveness. The League board felt it necessary to deal with the problem head on and challenge the assumptions, alleged "facts" and accusations of a small but vocal minority in this country whose actions discredit the seriousness of the issue and the integrity of current efforts. The League cannot in good conscience continue to passively accept or ignore such blatant attempts to undermine all that we have worked for years to achieve. By exposing misinformation for what it is, we enhance the credibility of valid information which leads us to the conclusion that Americans are still held captive in Southeast Asia. The League has dealt with four administrations and watched the POW/MIA issue used for national security reasons, political advantage, monetary gain, egoism and worse. In the past, the League was able to individually address such problems and personalities as they arose and interfered with progress towards our basic objective. Because of the current volume, such is no longer possible. The National League of Families is the only organization comprised solely of POW/MIA and KIA/BNR family members devoted to the return of American prisoners, the fullest possible accounting for those still missing and the repatriation of remains of those who died serving our nation in Southeast Asia. We were actively working to achieve these goals even prior to the formal inception of the National League of Families in May, 1970. The League fought status changes beginning in 1973, after the initial POW releases, and never conceded that all POWs were returned. We fought through the apathy of past administrations that rendered "lip service" to the accounting and did little to nothing to accelerate it. In the past, the League cajoled, pleaded, demonstrated - anything judged to be helpful in accomplishing our purpose. The mid to late 1970's represented the low point on the POW/MIA issue. To remind you, the readers, of how bad it was, the following quotes are 1 s-leg_183_003_002_A1b.pdf Page 3 of 8 This document is from the collections at the Dole Archives, University of Kansas http://dolearchives.ku.edu offered: 1976: Final Report of the House Select Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia: "The results of the investigation and information gathered during its 15-month tenure have led this committee to the belief that no Americans are still being held alive as prisoners in Indochina, or elsewhere, as a result of the war in Indochina." 1977: Summary Report of the Presidential Commission on Americans Missing and Unaccounted for in Southeast Asia: "There is no evidence to indicate that any American POWs from the Indochina conflict remain alive ... For reasons of terrain, climate, circumstances of loss and passage of time, it is probable that no accounting will ever be possible for most Americans lost in Indochina." 1976 - 1981: U.S. Government Position on Live POWs in Indochina: "There is no credible evidence to indicate that any Americans are currently held against their will in Indochina." In 1979 and 1980, no remains were returned government to government and no negotiations of substance occurred. During the 1970's, the POW/MIA branch (now a division) at Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) was slowly being put out of business, as was Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) capability and focus on Southeast Asia. The government had written off the possibility of anyone being alive, and our missing family members were being presumptively declared dead. The advent of the Reagan Administration, due to the President's long-standing personal interest, brought hope for renewed government effort to resolve the POW/MIA issue. The Administration developed a strategy that included raised intelligence priorities, executive branch negotiations, additional assets and personnel, integration of the issue into U.S. foreign policy, an official public awareness program and a new policy on the live prisoner issue, effective in 1982. Compare this statement with the previous versions, listed above: Although we have thus far been unable to prove that Americans are still detained against their will, the information available to us precludes ruling out that possibility. Actions to investigate live-sighting reports receive and will continue to receive necessary priority and resources based on the assumption that at least some Americans are still held captive. Should any report prove true, we will take appropriate action to ensure the return of those involved. The Reagan White House made contact with the League to solicit our views on strategy and past problems. They made contact with a number of other private POW/MIA groups and veterans organizations to ask their help and support for a new attempt to solve this issue. Every major suggestion put forth by the League, including a public awareness program, was adopted by the U.S. government. The League had seen public awareness work to influence Vietnamese perceptions and create favorable conditions for dialogue. The U.S. 2 government, committed to bilateral negotiations, aggressively participated in public awareness efforts. Consider the following direct quotation from the address of the President, January 28,1983: "We need greater public awareness from the American people. So I ask each American who hears or reads of this to find a way to help. No matter how small each individual effort may seem, it is needed." Public awareness efforts by the League, the government, other POW/MIA organizations and the major veterans groups reached millions of people who had no previous knowledge of the issue. Many of the newly concerned citizens and veterans did not know the history of the issue. Where valid information was received, tremendous support for the strategy was gained, and it influenced the Vietnamese to seriously address this issue. For the first time, the Foreign Ministers of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia included the POW/MIA issue in their January, 1984, policy communique, stating a willingness to cooperate with the U.S. government on the issue, based on the increased interest of the American people. Public attitudes were also noted in negotiations, and awareness efforts clearly helped. The League welcomes and seeks all constructive support. Concerned citizens and veterans groups have been the mainstay in efforts to resolve the POW/MIA issue; however, individuals, organizations or groups, no matter how well-intentioned, who disseminate misinformation or use it to advocate and support private, irresponsible cross-border forays to purportedly "rescue" POWs, are jeopardizing serious efforts, thus the fate of our relatives, and are opposed by the League as a matter of established policy. Such actions appear to have become a full-blown effort by a small core group to turn public awareness on its head and direct the attitudes of the American people against the only administration which has seriously tried to resolve this issue, thus providing the Vietnamese a potential excuse for delay or exploitation for political advantage without substantial progress. We have experienced this in the past. Another unfortunate result of such misinformation has been to turn the POW/MIA issue into a subject of sensationalistic, yellow journalism that undermines credibility with the national media. Responsible journalists investigate such allegations, and if found to be without substance, ignore the issue or write articles which discredit the issue. The blame for this lies squarely with those who continue to spread unfounded rumors and charges. An increasingly evident side-effect is the amount of time that government officials must devote to countering misinformation and answering public mail which results from unfounded reports. In the past two years, DIA personnel have expended over 1,000 manhours dealing with such demands. This total waste of critical resources directly interferes with priority on evaluation, analysis and collection of POW/MIA intelligence data. The DIA has been through a year-long congressional investigation, two internal audits and an Inspector General investigation because of charges of conspiracy and coverup, and no evidence to support such charges was found. Enough is enough! The blame for this lies squarely with those who continue to spread unfounded rumors and allegations. 3 s-leg_183_003_002_A1b.pdf Page 4 of 8 This document is from the collections at the Dole Archives, University of Kansas http://dolearchives.ku.edu Those most seriously involved should be gravely concerned at the erosion in the public mind of the official U.S. government position on live POWs. In response to unsubstantiated claims, U.S. officials are pressed to respond truthfully. Invariably, the media downgrades the live POW issue rather than accurately reporting official statements which counter an irresponsible or fabricated claim. The blame for this lies squarely with those who continue to spread unfounded rumors and charges. Such actions also play directly into the hands of those who view resolution of the POW/MIA issue as simply an obstacle to normal relations between Vietnam and the United States. This component of our society includes former government officials, some congressmen, old anti-war factions and some on the "left" side of the political spectrum. They are convinced that no Americans are still held captive and view the accounting and repatriation of remains as an unlikely prospect. Unsupportable and ridiculous claims provide an opportunity for this element to appear rational, reasonable and factual. Again, the blame for this lies squarely with those who continue to spread unfounded rumors and allegations. In our enthusiasm for resolution and as a result of our frustration, we all have been guilty of both overemphasis and oversimplication. This is natural, expected and can only be countered with education. This type of well-meaning mistake is not the focus of the League's Misinformation Report. Our focus is on the purposeful and premeditated distortion of facts, use of unfounded or fabricated reports to raise money and distribution of malicious gossip to attack and slander the League and others. In short, the focus is on irresponsible actions which are seriously damaging the overall effort to resolve the fates of our missing men. Literally hundreds of examples could have been used in the report, largely originating within a small core group; but because of the time needed for comprehensive research and space limitations, the most visible, representative examples have been selected. The League board of directors has verified and is fully confident of the information contained in this report. We ask each reader to objectively weigh the evidence presented and reach your conclusions with as much care and thought as we have attempted to bring to this project. Conspiracy and Coverup This charge has its real roots in history surrounding the unsatisfactory, incomplete and subsequently misleading results of the Paris Peace Accords, the nature of the secret war in Laos and Cambodia, the negative conclusions of the House Select Committee and the Woodcock Commission, and U.S. government reluctance over the years to provide the families with forthright answers to their questions. This mind set prevailed in varing degrees though three administrations (Nixon, Ford and Carter). It created a hostile and adversarial situation between the League and the U.S. government and 4 s-leg_183_003_002_A1b.pdf Page 5 of 8 This document is from the collections at the Dole Archives, University of Kansas http://dolearchives.ku.edu POLITICAL MOTIVATION The national president of Vietnam Veterans of America is Mr. Robert Muller, a Marine Corps Veteran, severely disabled while serving in Vietnam. Membership of national VVA is reported to be approximately 20,000 Vietnam veterans. While the National League of Families and VVA share a natural affinity of interests because of the Vietnam War, VVA's national president and others in their national leadership have consistently undermined the viability of the live POW and accounting issues as well as ongoing efforts to resolve both. In November, 1983, in an article which appeared in THE VILLAGE VOICE, the following statements were made by or about VVA President Robert Muller: "While a few groups, notably the League of Families, hold out hope that some of the MIAS may turn out alive, Muller says flatly that they are dead. 'Of course they are dead,' he says, 'The MIA issue has been exploited for political propaganda purposes by this administration and by various advocacy groups. The League of Families says there are Americans alive in Indochina. Really that ought to be defeated by the most basic question of all, to what advantage, why would the Vietnamese now fully ten years after the war be holding out people in any way, shape or form as captive or prisoner? I think on the elementary analysis, this issue has to evaporate. All it does is to keep the animosity of war going." (Emphasis added) Shortly after a VVA trip to Hanoi in early 1984, which followed the Armitage Delegation, VVA President Muller appeared on CBS Morning News and made the following statements : "I don't think there's going to be much opportunity for a whole lot more findings regarding sets of remains of (American) soldiers." "To finally have an open and clear channel for dialogue is very important." "He (Armitage) said everything was fine, that the Vietnamese had adopted a totally different attitude. The Vietnamese said quite the contrary." Following a December, 1984, trip to Vietnam by VVA, the following comments were made in the media by or about the views of Mr. Greg Kane, Special Assistant to VVA President Muller. On the live POW issue ... "We have no information that leads us to believe that there are live Americans in Vietnam." (Emphasis added) On normalizing relations ... "Joint U.S./Vietnamese searches for missing (American) veterans would be impossible since the two nations have no diplomatic ties ... VVA advocated a U.S. Interest Section in Hanoi." In an attempt to refute the League newsletter and in defense of the final report of the Select Committee on Americans Missing in Southeast Asia, Mr. John Deering, VVA National Membership Chairman wrote an article for VVA's national newspaper, dated January, 1985, which included the following: "Who is the Executive Director of the League of Families to attempt to 7 s-leg_183_003_002_A1b.pdf Page 6 of 8 This document is from the collections at the Dole Archives, University of Kansas http://dolearchives.ku.edu belittle the work of such a staunch veterans advocate as (Congressman G.V. ) Sonny Montgomery?“ "If DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency) is charged with the responsibility of funding, gathering, (and) collecting information, why are the League's MIA figures so much different than that of DIA?" Facts: The most critical aspect of the POW/MIA issue is concerted efforts to obtain the release of any Americans still held captive. That has been and is the League's most important objective. The League holds the position that American POWs are currently held against their will in Indochina; however, more importantly for the issue, the U. S. government's official position is now positive as outlined in the first section of this report. Such changes in official policy do not take place by accident but are based realistically on available intelligence data. A statement by VVA President Robert Muller, based on his personal view with no evidence to substantiate his position, serves Vietnam's interests rather than those of our men or their families. Muller views the POW/MIA issue as an obstacle to normalization of relations, a trumped up issue to enable the U.S. government to continue a policy which he considers hostile to Vietnam's best interest. Muller's assertion that little accountability is or will be available is refuted by factual, objective assessment by DIA of intelligence data. In November, 1979, a Vietnamese technician, commonly referred to as the "mortician," reported that he had personally prepared or observed the remains of over 400 U.S. military personnel who were lost as a result of the war in Southeast Asia. The mortician was brought to Washington, D.C. for several days of intensive interviews conducted by DIA and Army specialists. An initial polygraph conducted in Hong Kong indicated signs of deception; however, after DIA's thorough investigation, a restructuring of relevant questions and a re-examination specifically addressing the remains he prepared and observed, it was determined there was no deception on the part of the mortician. DIA's assessment of the mortician's information is not based solely on the polygraph results. The intensive investigation obtained other evidence that supports the validity of the mortician's report. The mortician also brought with him several documents, which have been deemed authentic, pilfered from the files of the Vietnamese Cemetery Management Committee. These documents further serve to support his claim to have processed American remains. The U.S. government has in its possession photographs of this same source taken during repatriation ceremonies in Hanoi, March 6, 1974, which portray the mortician performing technical duties. For these reasons and others, DIA's investigation, including the polygraph examinations and other evidence, resulted in the official position that the mortician was truthful when he reported to have personally observed the skeletal remains of approximately 400 American servicemen in Hanoi prior to mid-1977. Official, unclassified evaluation also contains the following: "In addition to providing the U.S. government with this very credible information pertaining to U.S. remains in the possession of the Vietnamese, the mortician also reported sighting three Caucasians whom he was told were Americans. The mortician saw these individuals on several occasions, 8 sometimes when they were visiting tourist attractions or government offices in Hanoi. Although these Caucasians were in the company of Vietnamese personnel, there was no indication they were under guard or otherwise captives. The mortician never spoke to the three, nor was he able to provide the U.S. government with their names or other identifying data." Muller's implication that no open and clear channel for dialogue exists between the U.S. and Vietnam is completely false. Not only has the U.S. opened policy level negotiations on the POW/MIA issue, technical level discussions are routinely held. Such discussions, agreed to by the Vietnamese at a minimum of six per year, provide the forum for exchanges of technical data, case files on missing Americans, evaluation of efforts made to date and the ability to pursue all areas of interest on the POW/MIA issue. Contrary to statements by national VVA, they did not facilitate such discussions, but delayed accelerated efforts. Policy level negotiations have been held several times in the last two years, most visibly in February 1984 (Armitage Delegation) and March, 1985, (Childress/Thach meetings), both of which were undertaken with representation by the League executive director. For VVA's national president to undermine very high level Vietnamese commitments to cooperate with the United States in accelerating efforts on the POW/MIA issue serves no purpose whatsoever - even Vietnam's ultimate objectives. The board of directors received comprehensive reports on negotiations conducted during both sessions and fully supports the manner in which they were conducted. Greg Kane's assertion that joint search efforts would be "impossible" due to the lack of diplomatic ties (normalization of relations) is refuted by the current status of technical level discussions. The Vietnamese have agreed to permit the first official, joint survey of a U.S. aircraft incident site and also agreed to consider the U.S. proposal for joint crashsite excavations. The League suffered from attempts to normalize relations during the Carter Administration - that time period when the fullest possible accounting was the "hoped for by-product" of the process. VVA's attempt to link political matters with the POW/MIA issue is not in the best interest of our missing relatives or the Vietnamese. Although VVA's national leadership may consider the POW/MIA issue as an unnecessary obstacle to normalization of relations, there are increasing signs that Vietnam is beginning to understand the need to resolve the problem as a means of improving the atmosphere between our two countries and to preposition themselves for eventual normalization of relations once the Cambodian issue is settled. As to the assertion that "the League's MIA figures" differ from those of DIA, again, totally false. The POW/MIA lists, routinely distributed by the League, are provided by DIA and are inclusive of all men listed as POW, missing or killed in action/body not recovered. That number does not fluctuate without reason, such as the repatriation of remains which obviously reduces the number of men whose fate is still unknown. The current number of American servicemen and civilians still missing and unaccounted for is 2,477. Finally, the efforts of Congressman Montgomery on the POW/MIA issue are well known to the League, surely better known to the families than to Mr. 9 s-leg_183_003_002_A1b.pdf Page 7 of 8 This document is from the collections at the Dole Archives, University of Kansas http://dolearchives.ku.edu Deering, returned POW that he is. There are strong differences between the Congressman's positions on the POW/MIA issue and those of the League. Pointing out those differences is a necessity and an obligation, particularly if not doing so could adversely affect the POW/MIA issue. To objectively state the facts is not to "belittle" but to clarify, and our differences with the Congressman on this issue have no relationship to his known advocacy and support for veterans. (Reference the League's Newsletter of November 28, 1984.) Individual VVA members and state and local organizations are actively involved in unified, productive public awareness efforts. The League seeks such support and strives to work with all veterans, civic and other groups seriously interested in our missing men. The national policy adopted by VVA on the POW/MIA issue caused the 1983-84 board of directors to officially oppose their involvement, a position supported by the current board of directors. It is our hope that VVA's general membership understands the need for protecting the best interests of our missing men, also Vietnam veterans, which required the position taken by the League. We also thank those numerous VVA chapters and members who unselfishly support our efforts. It is our hope that VVA's national leadership now understands that the League is obliged to oppose any efforts to remove this issue from the national agenda between the U.S. and Vietnam before resolution. DISINFORMATION Definition: Planting false information to influence public opinion. A more sinister aspect of disinformation appears to be coming from the Vietnamese government. The most visible example pertains to the rash of dogtag reports, either in isolation or associated with reports of remains. The purpose of this effort could be to discredit refugee sources, tie up intelligence analysts, (approximately 3,500 manhours in the last two years), gain leverage for Vietnamese objectives by alarming public opinion and causing divisiveness or a combination of these reasons. It is clear, however, that public reward offers and amateur private individuals or groups are being exploited both overseas and in the United States. League experience over the past three years confirms the validity of the following official, unclassified report: "While the collection and analysis of information pertaining to possible sightings of captive Americans is the priority effort of the Defense Intelligence Agency's POW/MIA Division, during the past three years nearly 550 reports have been received which pertain to the purported recovery of dog tags and/or remains of U.S. servicemen. Investigation has shown that approximately 70 percent of the Americans named in these "dog tag" type reports returned home alive following their tours in Vietnam. Another 20 percent were 10 s-leg_183_003_002_A1b.pdf Page 8 of 8